Opinion Policy Analysis by Alissar Azzam, Contributor

May 14th, 2021

The collapse of the Japanese empire at the end of World War II marked the end of its occupation over the Korean peninsula; an occupation so severe it left Koreans lacking all needed technical and administrative expertise to run their own country. As a result, the peninsula was split along the 38th parallel in adherence to Cold War spheres of influence, with the north under Soviet control and the south under American. However, this division that was only meant to last for 5 years turned into well over 5 decades when Soviet-installed leader Kim Il-Sung proclaimed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north in 1948 and managed to create a full dictatorship and cult of personality around him and his dynasty soon after. Coupled with a nuclear wildcard, the DPRK stands today as a thorn on the side of the USA with whom it shares a strained relationship still burdened by the legacy of the Korean War.  

As one of the most closed and isolated countries, the world has long struggled to get the full image of what goes on inside the so-called “hermit kingdom”. Oddly enough, and in light of the ongoing global covid-19 pandemic, its isolation has actually reaped favorable outcome in this one instance in which the regime claims here are no recorded cases of Covid-19 inside the country yet. North Korea was among the very first countries in the world to seal off their borders early on in 2020 which comes as no surprise with a leadership so paranoid on a normal day, let alone amidst a global pandemic! 

What has soon become clear however is that over a year into the pandemic, the closure has prompted the country to face its worst ever crisis under Kim Jong-Un. It is believed that the DPRK has reached the brink of a humanitarian crisis, if not already there. This came after the country adopted draconian measures to ward off any possible infection, including shoot-to-kill orders in its newly created buffer zone along the northern border to anyone trying to cross on both sides. Inside vision was further impaired when the last of humanitarian aid workers, whose work had already been confined to their offices in Pyongyang for 6 months, left the country in December after the foreign ministry announced that relaxation of restrictions is not to be expected anytime soon, prompting some Russian diplomats to exit the country on a hand-pushed trolley.

Early on, drastic quarantines were imposed on all Koreans re-entering the country where they were placed in governmental facilities for long periods of time - some up to 40 and 50 days - and were offered little food. The leadership also seems to believe yellow dust could carry Covid-19 from China or overseas. In late April, North Korea banned all outdoor activities and asked all citizens and foreigners to stay inside and seal their windows in anticipation of a dust storm. This was the third time such request was issued after two previous dust storms - one in mid-March and another in late October - swept through the country. Domestic travel was also greatly restricted due to Covid-19, hampering the ability of those in rural areas to access food and medicine among other necessities. In addition, North Korea announcedthey will be skipping this summer’s Tokyo Olympics amidst pandemic fears, one of the few platforms where sideline diplomacy is pursued with the country. 

In 2017, North Korea launched intercontinental ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, many of which experts say could potentially reach as far as any US major city for the first time. This prompted an emergency debate within the UN and international community, culminating in heavy sanctions on the regime since. Coupled with severe floods resulting from natural disasters in the period from June to September 2020, a yearlong lockdown only came to exacerbate an already dire situation. In June 2020, a spokeswoman from the World Food Program described the humanitarian situation inside the country as “bleak” and that 40% of the population of 25 million are in need of humanitarian aid.

Only a small portion of North Korea’s land is suitable for agriculture. This means that it highly depends on imports for its food supply, 90% of which comes from China. Trade with China last year plunged more than 80%, according to Reuters. And in the first two months of 2021, trade had almost entirely ceased. Another sector and one of the last sources of foreign currency and income for the regime amidst heavy sanctions was tourism; this too was halted by the pandemic.  

Upon that, and speaking to members of the ruling party last month, Kim Jong Un called for another “Arduous March” in reference to the aftermath of North Korea’s worst-ever crisis which proclaimed what some place at up to 3 million lives: the 90’s famine. While this indeed validates concerns, it served to strengthen his grip on power, increase party loyalty, and ensure national unity in upping domestic produce. This falls in line with what others believe it to be a message to the west that no matter how hard things get, he won’t lower standards when it comes to concessions for having sanctions removed. 

In this light, it is important to note that when it comes to North Korea, the humanitarian situation cannot be separated from the nuclear question. Last week, the Biden administration concluded its policy review on North Korea, and it seems to have understood that a deviation from Bush’s “axis of evil”, Obama’s “strategic patience” and Trump’s photo-ops summits is a must. But the regime seems to have different ideas…

The White House made it clear that no grand bargain or major breakthrough is being designed by the current administration, but rather its approach will be centered on diplomacy. On one hand, the DPRK was quick to slam the comments, regarding the review as a continuation of a long history of hostile policy (especially with the resumption of joint US-South Korean military exercises in March) and threatened that further provocation will end up in a “very grave situation” for the US. On the other hand, and on a more optimistic note, the regime has left a back-channel open door for discussion, according to Glyn Ford, a former European parliament member with close connections to high-ranking North Korean officials.

The South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, will be having his first meeting with President Biden on May 21st, and it is expected that North Korea will top their agenda after which further details on the admin’s policy would unveil. It is worthy to note here that among America’s biggest allies in the region, Seoul has long advocated for more economic engagement and sanction relaxation with the north, whereas Tokyo has adopted a much tougher line towards Pyongyang. In this case, the US finds itself trying to balance both expectations as it stays keen on maintaining a strong alliance between the two to better counter the rise of China. 

With that said, and while holding on to complete denuclearization as a prerequisite for diplomacy eliminates all prospects for a concrete solution, it does not change the fact that it should remain the end-goal—which in itself is not possible without China. On the 12th of April, the PRC appointed a new special representative on Korean affairs after 2 years of having the position vacant. The timing is especially notable, and it signals readiness on the Chinese behalf for multilateral engagement. However, we all know it more likely means that China will use its leverage on North Korea to score some gains with the new administration, as both their endgames for the peninsula are completely different.

After a tough year and a half for north Koreans who have little option but to conform to the regime’s will, efforts at easing the ongoing humanitarian crisis seem underway with the regime embarking on a new project of nationwide river redevelopment and building flood preventive infrastructure, as well as completing new facilities for disinfecting imported goods along the border allowing the resumption of trade with China. But while China did extend an extremely needed lifeline to millions of hungry Koreans, one can’t ignore the fact that by keeping the regime afloat, it remains the reason behind their hunger in the first place. 

On a final note, as we wait for the details of Biden’s policy to unveil, the world shall not forget there’s an oppressed 25 million bearing the brunt of an old strategy in a new rivalry; a continued tradition of cold war proxy conflicts, only this time going head-to-head with the dragon that’s no longer rising – but has already long risen.