Opinion Foreign Policy Analysis by Francesco Pitzalis, Staff Writer

November 11th, 2020

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long bucked the trend of euro-centric, secular Turkish politics. Instead, he has garnered domestic support from rural and conservative Turks who resonate with his Islamic dialogue and veneration of Turkey’s Ottoman past. In recent months Erdogan’s muscle-flexing in the Mediterranean, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh have triggered diplomatic fist-fights with a number of key Western powers. Saliently, French President Macron and Erdogan have descended into a culture war following Macron’s refusal to condemn cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. This prompted Erdogan to vociferously advocate for a boycott of French products across the Muslim world. Tensions were further exacerbated by the  publication of a crude cartoon of Erdogan in Charlie Hebdo; which buttressed Erdogan’s assertion that Europe is fundamentally “anti-Islam”.

Paradoxically, the presupposition that President Erdogan is a protector of Islam is about as soft as Turkish delight. Erdogan’s foray into Syria was facilitated by a burgeoning “bromance” with covert Islamophobe, Donald Trump. Erdogan has also extended cooperation with China in developing the new “silk road”. The prospective silk road project slices through the North-eastern Chinese region of Xinjiang and underpins a murderous Chinese crackdown against the region’s Uyghur Muslims. Curiously, the Turkish president’s condemnations of Uyghur persecution have become muted whilst Turkey’s relationship with China has blossomed.

Indeed, Chinese investment remains a lifeline for an ailing Turkish economy that has witnessed a tanking currency and huge losses as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Perhaps Muslim lives are more expendable when they are backed by a flow of Chinese Yuans. 

It therefore begs the question why Erdogan would lead the charge against Islamophobia in France despite his detachment to Muslim persecution in China. The purpose of such rhetoric is two-fold. Firstly, to distract from Turkey’s economic woes and secondly, in order for Turkey to extend its tentacles across the Middle East as it burns European bridges. In directly opposing the secularism of Macron, Erdogan has now positioned himself as the guardian of one of two irreconcilable world views. In essence, the Turkish President masquerades ambitions of ottoman-style expansion with a façade of Islamic custodianship. With numerous cities across the Islamic world responding to Erdogan’s call for protests, Erdogan’s game of demagogic identity politics seems to be working. 

However, the Turkish strongman’s exploits have managed to concurrently alienate two heavyweight allies. Firstly, an amicable relationship with Donald Trump has been shaken by Turkey’s testing of Russian-made, S-400, anti-aircraft defence system. This triggered the Americans to remove Turkey from its F-35 fighter jet programme and threaten economic sanctions. Simultaneously, Erdogan’s ventures into Nagorno-Karabakh and use of Syrian Jihadist mercenaries have tested the patience of fellow authoritarian, Vladimir Putin. A recent Russian air strike against a Turkish proxy in Syria was seen as a warning shot against Erdogan’s aggression towards the Armenians. Thus, with diplomatic pressure on multiple fronts Erdogan uses the last card in his deck; a calculated appeal to the Islamic world for support. 

Up to this point Erdogan has accomplished a miraculous diplomatic juggling act to dodge economic sanctions. However, this period of brinkmanship will likely reach a rather sour conclusion. Erdogan faces the threat of European and American sanctions, in addition to an escalation of conflict with Putin’s Russia. With his Foreign policy decimating investor confidence in the Turkish economy, Erdogan may need to change tact.

However, the Turkish President’s spate of strong arming is undoubtedly self-reinforcing. The more he is alienated by the West; the more Erdogan enacts the policy fitting of an Ottoman sultan.

This time, however, one too many alarm bells may be ringing.