Opinion policy analysis by Johnny Achkar, Contributor

April 13th, 2021

Nikol Pashinyan, a former newspaper editor, ascended to power in the post-Soviet republic with around 3 million people in an astonishing manner. In 1995, he was suspended from university for his political activities, and in 2000, he wascharged with libel as the editor-in-chief of Haykakan Zhamanak. In 2004, his vehicle was blown up in an apparent assassination plot, and in 2008, he went into exile for months after being accused of inciting political demonstrations that resulted in the deaths of ten people. In 2010, he was sentenced to seven years in jail, but an amnesty allowed him to be released the following year. He started protesting against Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan's power-grab in 2018 by walking from village to village around the country. Before April 2018, the governing Republican Party seemed to have a firm grip on Armenian affairs, with Sargsyan having been reinstated as prime minister after term limits had forced him to resign as president after ten years.

However, allegations that Sargsyan abused the constitution to cling to power arose because of governance reforms that strengthened the prime minister's office. Hundreds of thousands of people joined Pashinyan and other demonstrators in the streets of Yerevan, paralyzing the city. In a shocking concession to the opposition, Sargsyan resigned on April 23, 2018. During the demonstrations, Pashinyan was arrested and later freed, calling for snap elections to elect a new "people's prime minister," which would later go on to win. Pashinyan is regarded as one of history's great nonviolent revolutionaries, according to his supporters. Eduard Aghajanyan, a city council member from Pashinyan's Civil Contract faction and one of Pashinyan's young, western-educated advisors, once likened him to Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. However now, some are branding the prime minister a "traitor" for agreeing to what they claim is a shameful compromise with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has also managed to anger Armenia’s powerful neighbor Russia.

Armenia has attempted to maintain a neutral foreign policy since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Fair foreign policy, on the other hand, does not imply equitable ties between both partners. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia became Armenia's major collaborator and sole military ally. Moscow has since spent more than a decade carefully cultivating the picture of a great power that jealously guards its droit de regard in most of the post-Soviet space. The partnership was formed for a variety of purposes, beginning with historical ones. Russia was seen as a hero in Armenia in the mid-nineteenth century, having rescued it from the Persian Empire. Armenia has been under joint Azerbaijan-Turkeypressure since 1991, and it has no alternative but to anchor itself with Russia in these circumstances. Pashinyan has treaded a fine line since assuming power in 2018 in what he dubbed the "Velvet Revolution." He has also attempted toconvince Russia that Armenia's former geopolitical orientation, which includes membership in the defense-focusedCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the trade bloc Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), would not change. Nonetheless, the issue that might end Pashinyan’s premiership and lead to his political downfall involves a disputed region called Nagorno-Karabakh, known as Artsakh in Armenian, whereupon he recently lost the territory to Armenia’s arch nemesis Azerbaijan. Mr. Pashinyan has also failed to do himself any favors by rebuking Armenia’s prime ally, Russia.

When the Soviet Union was established in the 1920s, the current republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan became part of it. Nagorno-Karabakh was an ethnically Armenian-dominated territory before the Soviets handed it over to Azerbaijani authorities. In the 1980s, as tensions between the Soviet Union's constituent republics grew, Nagorno-Karabakh voted to join Armenia, despite the fact that it was still part of Azerbaijan at the time.

This sparked a war that ended with a truce in 1994, culminating in Armenia's victory. Since then, the UN has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, but it is still governed by separatist ethnic Armenians supported by the Armenian state. Negotiations orchestrated by foreign powers have failed to produce a peace deal until recently. When Prime Minister Pashinyan was elected in 2018, and afterfree elections were held that year, he and President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan agreed to de-escalate tensions and establish the first military hotline between the two countries. Mr. Pashinyan would later declare on one occasion, while addressing crowds of ethnic Armenians gathered in Stepanakert, Karabakh's main district, in August 2019 that "Artsakh is Armenia, full stop." President Aliyev repeatedly condemned the comments, which enraged Azerbaijan.

On September 27, 2020, the new crisis erupted.

Azerbaijan, according to Armenia, was the first to shoot. In reaction to Armenian hostility, Azerbaijan announced the start of a "counter-offensive." Turkish drones pounded Armenian defenses, which were eventually overwhelmed by Azerbaijani ground troops and Syrian mercenaries. Both sides agreed to sign a Russian-brokered peace treaty in November, bringing the fighting to a close. Armenia gave up possession of swaths of land it had conquered around Karabakh three decades ago under the ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire will be observed by almost 2,000 Russian peacekeepers.

After Armenia's crushing defeat in the Karabakh war last year, Pashinyan has been in a precarious situation. In Yerevan, there are no tanks on the streets. Mr. Pashinyan, on the other hand, is struggling for his political survival. On February 25, hundreds of officers ordered the prime minister's resignation, accusing him of incompetence, including the country's top soldier, Onik Gasparyan. “In light of the current situation, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia urge the resignation of the Prime Minister and the government of the Republic of Armenia, while also cautioning against the use of force against those who have died defending the homeland and Artsakh,” the officers said. Mr. Pashinyan denounced the attempt at a coup, declined to back down, and instead ordered Mr. Gasparyan to do so. The surrender came as a shock and a betrayal to many Armenians who had been convinced by the army and the government that the war was going their way. Mr. Pashinyan was promptly chastised. The opposition have blamed him for starting the war and breaking the peace. Protesters gathered in front of government offices. At a rally in front of the parliament, Hrachya Abramyan, a veteran of both Karabakh wars, says, "Pashinyan sold out my homeland and my people." “If he doesn't resign, we'll seize his ears and drive him out like a dog.” An offer of snap elections has not caught the interest of the opposition parties. Most people claim to be on the brink of supporting a coup attempt. Former minister Davit Harutyunyan says, "I don't like the notion." “However, if I believe that failing to take the next action would result in the loss of the nation and civil war, then I will certainly take it.” According to Yervand Bozoyan of the Yerevan research institute PolitEconomia, the crisis wasunavoidable due to the Armenian constitution's relationship with Karabakh. One can easily point out that Mr. Pashinyan has performed miserably in his prime ministerial duties, which require the head of state to ensure the stability of the region. A handful of critics have argued that the army's action violated the constitution in and of itself, but the dire circumstances may have justified such drastic measures. The army, as one of the country's defense guarantors, should not remain silent in such a sensitive situation. Hayk Martirosyan, a member of the opposition alliance National Democratic Axis, identified many reasons that he believes are to blame for the current crisis. “The first is the treacherous battle, which was destined to fail from the start and was waged in such a way,” he added. “The second is Pashinyan's bid to cling to power while still trying to scapegoat the military elite, who have been his most ardent supporters up to this stage. Mr. Pashinyan is unworried. “There will be no coup”, he states while adding, “As long as the Armenian people have the final say.” He claims that the only way out of the turmoil that is engulfing his country is through the ballot box and early elections.

In the last five years, Russia has supplied 94 percent of Armenia's military hardware. The two countries concluded a deal in 2015, under which Russia agreed to include a $200 million loan in exchange for military equipment supplied in 2018. Pashinyan said in a February 23 interview that the Iskander missiles in Armenia's arsenal, the country's most advanced weapons, were essentially duds. “They didn't burst, or maybe 10% of them exploded,” he said of the Iskanders fired during the battle for Karabakh. When the interviewer pressed him on whether that was accurate, Pashinyan replied cryptically, "I don't know... maybe they were guns from the 1980s." I regret to inform you Mr. Pashinyan that the Iskander is not a throwback to the 1980s. It is Russia's most sophisticated ballistic missile, and its acquisition by Armenia in 2016 was seen as a game-changer in the country's arms race with Azerbaijan. It offered Armenia the opportunity to hit Baku and its vital oil and gas resources for the first time. Apart from Russia, Armenia is the only country that owns it. Pashinyan's provocation was a greater misfire than the Armenian Iskanders reportedly were, especially since weapons shipments are a serious industry in Russia and Russian weaponry is a matter of state pride. Viktor Zavarzin, the deputy head of the State Duma security committee, said Pashinyan's comment was a "total lie" and that he was only seeking to divert attention away from his own mistakes.

Moreover, Mr. Pashinyan has never been able to escape the reputation of a pro-Western politician who is distrusted by the Kremlin. To understand this we must delve into the prime minister’s past. 

Pashinyan began to remember his previous comments and the foreign policy path proposed during the 2017 parliamentary elections as his political weight grew in the spring of 2018. Pashinyan has publicly stated that Armenia will work for European integration and will leave the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. At one point, the parliamentary faction to which Mr. Pashinyan belonged to, introduced a bill on Armenia's removal from the EAEU. Naturally, it was rejected but the damage was done. Another blunder by Pashinyan involved a trial after his ascent to power. Following the 2018 revolt, law enforcement authorities were involved in the activities of major Russian capital in Armenia. The emphasis was on Russian Railways' subsidiary, the South Caucasian Railway, as well as Gazprom's subsidiary, Gazprom-Armenia. In the first instance, two court charges were filed at the same time, one of which was for invasion of office. In addition, the gas giant became embroiled in a fiasco involving widespread tax avoidance. In all situations, the matter was resolved – after Moscow's firm claims. 

Mr. Pashinyan had hoped to free Armenia from Russia's grip and strengthen ties with Western powers. That is no longer an option. Armenia, reeling from a losing battle, sandwiched between two old foes and irritated by Western silence, now relies more than ever on Russia's defense promises, regardless of who is in power. In order to save what is left of his political career, Mr. Pashinyan must reconcile with his people, while also seeking Moscow’s advice in regards to any future steps.