Analysis by Reem El Dana, Staff Writer

April 10th, 2021

Iraq was subsumed into the Ottoman empire before the end of WWI; the treaty of Sèvres in 1920 demarcated the artificial border lining of modern-day Iraq.

Iraq made little sense as a nation, concluded the first monarch King Faisal; there were no Iraqis in Iraq. His vindication couldn’t be refuted since the Ottoman rule trifurcated Iraq into three self-governing provinces: Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra with each vilaya having its religious traditions. With multiethnic Iraq came conflict. With conflict came resentment, and with resentment came local grievances, retributions, and oppression. Today, the cycle whirls infinitely and viciously, as previously ousted Shia militias control key functions and ministries at the Government of Iraq (GoI). The attrition of the Baath regime and concurrently, the de-Baathification carried out by the US, gave the Shia and the Kurds, previously excluded by Saddam, the right to rule along with other sects under a mohasasa or consociational governance model. However, the Iraqi Governing Council which was handed the de-Baathification procedure by the Americans resulted in highly contentious policies that were akin to “de-Sunnification”. The process was cited to be among the “worst transitional justice processes in living memory”.

 

The path to democracy was far from rosy. After the fall of Saddam and the subsequent disbandment of the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraq fell into a dark abyss, an abyss so deep that some nationals are nostalgic for Hussein’s oppressive rule over the mooted sectarian and divisive rule the Iraqis live by today.

 

Since the creation of modern Iraq in 1920, oil-rich and multiethnic Mesopotamia suffered from conflicts spurred by a genocidal dictator, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ISIL, and concomitantly the PMF whose sectarian strife marginalized, vexed, and eliminated ethnic and religious groups.  

 

As a result of politics of exclusion and therefore sidelining major constituents, notably the Shia and Kurds during Saddam’s age, and consequentially the Iraqi Sunnis after 2003, the phenomenon of politicizing security state institutions proved to be internecine because exclusionary policies blatantly backfired against whoever was in power. In 2004, AQI sought retribution and to upend the unfavorable status quo for a myriad of reasons including the relegation of Baathist security officials, the occupation including coalition forces, and the new government structure. The new political order in Iraq, designed by the US, sequestered power from Sunnis (Baathists) and allocated it to its new local partners: the Shia and the Kurds.

 

This paper covers multifarious topics that make up the multi-layered Iraqi political and security structure today. It would be erroneous to solely blame the US for the Iraqi sectarian turf wars.

While Ayatollah Khamenei claims that the Islamic State is contrived by the Americans, he disregards the long history of Iranian meddling into Iraqi politics, and he eschews mentioning how Iran formed the very nucleus of Iraqi military factions. 

 

It is undoubtedly true that the 2003 invasion tilted the balance to the Shia majority and the beleaguered Kurds, however, democracy is political and cultural plurality, and the lack of national reconciliation after 2003 significantly led to where Iraq stands today. 

 

The transition from an authoritarian regime to a power-sharing configuration, the switch from a secularist state to a fevered Sunni-Shia battle, the institutionalization of Shia political parties and their subsequent domination of the Iraqi parliament and key ministries, and most importantly the rise of non-state armed actors including AQI and ISIL, all engulfed, incited and moralized the fight of Sunnis against the occupation, the Sunni-Shia civil war, and the successive Shia intra violence. 

There are a bountiful of other valid reasons that justify why ISIL surfaced, I argue that the US set the stage for its creation as an unintended consequence of its foreign policy towards Iraq, or lack thereof after the removal of Saddam. There is no doubt that the US is significantly responsible for the weak state of Iraq today. Absent weapons of mass destruction and Saddam’s link to Al-Qaeda, the US invasion sought to instill its liberal hegemony model, imbue democracy, and protect its key allies in the region. Albeit ambitious, the US lacked an exhaustive execution and implementation plan and left too fast in 2011. 

 

As an unintended consequence, the biggest beneficiaries were undoubtedly Iran and exiled Shia Iraqis who now have the space to exert their political clout since their Shia religious leaders were stripped from political roles during Saddam’s age. Notable religious leaders were Mohamad Baqir al-Sadr, Mohamad Taqi al-Khoei, and Mohamad Sadiq al-Sadr.

 

This paper will not tackle the nitty-gritty details of the Iraqi civil unrest from 2004 until 2014 but will rather emphasize the danger in politicizing state security institutions, having militias control key ministries such as defense and interior, and the need to avail of critical US military assistance in the Middle East, especially counter-terrorism services.

Also, I will shed light on the parlous corollaries of having highly divisive sectarian politicians whose tutelage does not serve the national interest, but rather deepens ethnic and sectarian divides and creates an enabling environment for extremist groups to surface. 

 

Therefore, politicizing state security institutions lead to a state’s inability to monopolize violence, protect its people from non-state armed actors, and neutralize terror threats efficiently and effectively. As a result, porous borders make arms and human trafficking frugally simple and amp up security vulnerabilities as militias compete against each other and the state for power, and consecutively oppose state reforms that may harm their interests.

 

This paper explores how sectarianism and politicized state security institutions, and non-state armed actors (NSAA) led to the rise of the Islamic State. While the reality of NSAA is twofold; one belonging to Sunni extremists and one to Shia whose roles and allegiance are transnational, I stress the importance of having secular, non-political, non-partisan state security apparatuses made up of a multiethnic cadre of fighters that are capable of thwarting off threats whilst holding national interests atop. I take the example of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) as a case in point.

 

In the coming section, I’ll demonstrate the circumstances and pretexts under which Iraqi militias were formed to combat Saddam’s regime, the US during the occupation years, and ISIL. The most important takeaway is to understand the impact of militias on state functions. How are militias in Iraq curbing the effectiveness of state security functions? How is their carte-blanche granting them unlimited access to political affairs without recourse? And how are these militias whose allegiance is mainly to Iran (some of the factions are Sunni, Christian, etc.) are in a direct collision course against the vision of the Iraq state? 

 

Ideology 

 Ideology is the most precarious weapon, in my opinion, surpassing the lethality of arms in all their forms. It is a hefty and rampant medium through which zealots and leaders spout their eclectic beliefs to a hungry and emotional crowd that isn’t wooed by an alternative and is in turn cajoled by fervor, regardless of the cause and content. The Middle East exhibits a Hobbesian state of nature where every man is against every man, a state of nature grounded in competing ideologies like Baathism, Khomeinism, Wahhabism, and the cult of the Islamic State who jolts to dominate and wreak havoc while doing so. 

 

In Iraq, differences in ideologies have led to conflicts and widespread harm to all stakeholders. Yet, the overt and covert employment of clientelism, confessionalism, nepotism, favoritism, and sectarianism did not spare Iraqis from divisive ethno-sectarian lines that sow discord, framed in protecting identities.

 

Ideology, par excellence, is the staunchest factor that stimulates fervor among fighters who fight in the name of defensive jihad. Akin to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq responded to the fatwa issued by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in fighting the Islamic State. The obfuscation of the paramilitary who officially became part of the Iraqi Security Forces in 2016 by a law passed by the Iraqi parliament, in light of the war against the Islamic State, can be simplified by a walk-in Iraq’s past. The leaders of the Iraqi paramilitaries, notably the late Abu Mahdi al Mohandis, Hadi al Amiri, and Qais al Khazaali inter alia are overtly backed and trained by Iran.

 

Saddam’s Anfal Campaign: Silencing the Kurds & Shias

 Saddam Hussein’s unreasonable desires and overreaching incursions in Iran and Kuwait impoverished the nation, regressed Iraq’s economy, and contrived sectarian belligerent. His elimination by the US carried cataclysmic consequences for Iraq and paved a rapturous political space, that was once inaccessible, for Iraqi Shias loyal to Iran.  

 

More to that, he silenced a majority made up of Iraqi Shia, Kurds, and Baathist acolytes because he was obsessed with imperium and feared an independent Kurdistan whose secession would hamper his unified Arab nation, or Arabization wherein Iraq stood as its vanguard. The Kurdish city of Halabja witnessed an evisceration of citizens as Saddam used mustard gas against thousands of Kurds. The Kurds ‘dream of establishing an autonomous Kurdistan was a threat to Saddam’s Arabization drive and thus he ensured their vision would wither. 

 

Likewise, the crime that sent Saddam to the gallows was the 1982 Dujail massacre that annihilated 160 men from a Shia village, for attacking Saddam’s convoy. It is the first case to ever be filed against Saddam Hussein. It’s important to note that the Anfal campaign incubated radicals in Mosul. Mosul had always been a Sunni stronghold since a large number of Baathist officials come from there; they’re the same officials who had their jobs stripped during the de-Beatification process and therefore makes them “remnants” of Baathists that the US did not manage to obviate during the 2003 war. 

 

He latched on to power and left no security or power vacuum as the Baath regime penetrated all state institutions. Uprisings, acts of state subversion, and power usurpation from different ethnic and religious groups was met with pogroms and an unproportionate use of force against the Kurds and the Shia in the Anfal campaign of the 1980s. His oppressive regime sent to exile many Iraqi Shias who challenged the status quo and in turn formed powerful political parties in Iran. The most notable groups are the Badr Organization and the Dawa Party who received training and funding from the IRGC. Most of the political parties had military wings; the Dawa Party military wing was led by Abu Mahdi al Muhandis before he moved to the Badr Brigade. Notable secretary generals of the Dawa Party are prime ministers Ibrahim Jaafari who served as the first PM post-2003, and Nouri Al Maliki who served as PM between 2006 and 2014 for 8 years.

 

The 2003 war bolstered neighboring Vilayat-e faqih, the Iraqi dissidents and exiles who sought refuge in Iran and paved the way for the new democratic Iraq. Security vacuums were exploited by the very same dramatis personae who morphed Iraq’s new identity. 

 

Strong state institutions are less likely to collapse if they have the capability and the capacity to fend off risks that are critical to national security and state survival. Of the factors that hinder state capacities and capabilities to react to imminent threats are the internal divisions contrived in state institutions. In Iraq, systemic corruption is prevalent and is a direct consequence of sectarian clientelism and bureaucratic infighting. “The patronage culture within the Iraqi army, favoring loyalty over merit was bound to lead its institutional collapse”, wrote Inna Rudolf. 

 

The 2003 war on Iraq resulted in odious unintended consequences, most striking among them are the Iraqi civil war and the rise of ISIL/ISIS/Daesh. The occupation and the violence that ensued in the removal of Saddam Hussein were incubating factors that brewed Iraq’s fall into the abyss. The de-Baathification plan, a shortsighted plan that sought to replicate de-Nazification, administered by Paul Bremer III, presaged the beginning of the civil war in Iraq as the Iraqi army was disbanded. The new Iraq was based on politics of exclusion; the Sunnis were marginalized and thus created the auspicious circumstances for extremist groups to fester. 

 

The Iran-Iraq War & Iraqi Militias 

 The Iran-Iraq war created the virulent cadre and context for Iraqi Shia to contrive sectarianism and dichotomize ideological preferences as the Baath and Khomeinist regimes were engaged in prolonged bloodshed. The nascent Islamic theocracy birthed from the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, beset Mr. Hussein’s ambition to dominate the Arab world and tilt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf as he attacked Iran and Ensuingly Kuwait. 

 

Following the fall of Saddam and the de-Baathification of the Iraqi army, a prolonged wave of sectarian violence set the mood for the next decade in Iraq. The capture of Mosul by ISIL spurred the highest Shia cleric in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to issue a fatwa to fight ISIL, calling the myriad Iraqi Shia militias, loyal or indifferent to Iran, Sunnis, and others to join the ranks.

 

Many of the founders of the Iraqi militias such as the Badr Brigade and the Dawa Party sought refuge in Iran when exiled during the war and returned to Iraq when Saddam was sent to the gallows. Akin to the formation of Saddam’s Baath regime wherein he presided over the militia that took over the ministries of intelligence and internal security and thus seeded the security apparatus that controlled Iraq, today the Iraqi militias backed by Iran have reproduced the same model. 

 

Iran-backed political parties rooted, trained, and funded by Iran morphed into military wings that constantly relegate Iraq’s sovereignty as a result of their independent acts, and their covers from GoI, namely the Ministry of Interior, whose ministers are always Badr Brigade officials.

 

A coterie of Iranian-backed militias controlled the office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Interior & the FedPol inter alia 

 Hadi Al-Amiri has a history of instigating sectarian violence in Iraq, in a period of heightened violence from 2004-2006. He’s first and foremost the leader and SG of the Badr Organization. An exiled Iraqi during the era of Saddam, he’s also a member of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, formerly SCIRI. He returned to Iraq to capitalize on the power vacuum. Under Nouri Al Maliki, Al-Amiri served as the minister of transport from 2011-2014 and was the de facto leader of the ministry of interior when a lesser-known member of the Badr Organization was elected for the position. Theron, fears of Iranian influence, and militia infiltration were poignant and heavily felt.

Al-Amiri was entrusted with the command over the Iraqi Army and police in Diyala, the town he comes from, therefore placing a leader of a militia as commander of a faction of the IA. As for porous borders, Hadi Al-Amiri, who was minister of transport guaranteed a leeway for Iran that met deserved criticism for allowing the Mullah regime to supply the Assad regime with weaponry in fighting the Syrian opposition. 

The infamous leader ordered attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis; members of his militia were entrenched in the Iraqi security forces who in turn had tortured and killed Sunnis, under the pretext of their affiliation of a Baath party, or members of ISIL. The Iran-backed Shia militias under the control of Al-Amiri seemed keen on erasing Sunni influence from previously held ISIS territories, under the guidance of Iran. Thus, promoting Iran’s agenda in Iraq seemed to collide with the Iraqi national identity that some PM attempted to promote. “When I withdraw my forces now the Sunnis will come back and they will become an incubator for ISIS again. When I liberate an area from ISIS why do I have to give it back to them? Either I erase it or settle Shia in it”, a statement by a Badr militant in 2014.

Paramilitary units within the Ministry of Interior were accused of acting as a death squad at the height of Sunni Shia sectarian strife during the occupation years. Nader Uskowi in his book Temperature Rising: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Wars in the Middle East elucidates the creation of the PMF as a paradigm shift. He confounds that the Quds Force’s strategic objective was to dominate a major security institution in Iraq. Controlling the FedPol was a tactical objective of the Quds Force since it was in charge of a major security institution and its oldest proxy was funded by Iraqi oil revenues.

 

He and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis formed the PMF which later became part of the ISF, therefore giving the militia not only legitimacy but also authorization to the Quds Force to have a principal role in the country’s security institutions. The three Quds Force lead militant organizations: Badr Organization, Kataib Hezbollah, and AAH, formed the very nucleus of the PMF. 

The rise of ISIL facilitated the creation and institutionalization of PMF, an umbrella group of over fifty although not entirely Shiite militants, encompassing approximately 140,000 volunteers. Such volunteers cemented the Iranian influence over Iraqi security policy as Uskowi mentions. The PMF’s infiltration into the ISF had given them a flexible margin to conduct military abuses with impunity; such abuses could be categorized as war crimes.

Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and Hadi Al-Amiri were Qassem Soleimani’s top men in Iraq. 

 

Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, known for being the most influential leader of the PMF, split from the Badr Corps in 2003 to form Kataib Hezbollah (KH), widely known for launching attacks against US forces in Iraq. He was elected as MP under the Dawa Party electoral list, and in 2014 he was in charge of organizing the Iran-backed Shia militants to fight ISIS, under the request of then PM Nouri al-Maliki. He received training from the IRGC and was proven to be behind embassy bombings in Kuwait, and the attempted assassination of the Kuwait Emir in the 1980s.

 

Qais al Khazalib was a pro-Iranian fighter among the Sadrists or the Mahdi Army led by Muqtada al Sadr. He and his squad started acting independently, and thus split from the Sadrist group and formed Asaib Ahl al Haq.

The militia became notorious during 2006-207 for the sectarian violence, conducting assassinations, kidnappings, and attacks on US forces. He was detained by the coalition from 2007-2011 and later released by PM Nouri al-Maliki. 

 

The rise of ISIL & the PMF

The Badr Organization was an indispensable cadre of militants when Mosul fell to ISIS in 2014. After Ayatollah Sistani called the youth of Iraq to fight against ISIL, the PMF was formed and thus took over the fight against ISIS. Albeit glorious and liberating battles, the hashd which dovetailed with the FedPol had raised suspicions and fear among Sunni habitants in ISIL liberated cities. 

After ISIL was purged from Iraqi cities or during some battles that Iraqi security forces were holding, the PMF was restricted to the borders of Mosul and around the city’s outskirts. The abuse of power by the previous Minister of Interior Qassem Araji (Badr Organization member) allowed the PMF, who simply changed their hashd uniform into FedPol uniform, to take on unofficial activities in Mosul. They were accused of shaping dynamics ahead of parliamentary elections. 

 

The not only disjointed but also weak and dysfunctional security system in Iraq has left its citizens vulnerable to PMF and ISIL. It’s important to note that Nouri Al Maliki’s appointment of Shia security officials to lead Mosul’s security forces, amplified the sectarian vibes around the city. The security forces which were heavily infiltrated by the hashd are allegedly accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, and the likes of Sunnis. Thus, when ISIL entered Mosul, some Sunnis welcomed them and joined their ranks against the Shia who repressed them. Sunnis were being compulsorily relocated by government-affiliated Shia militants in Diyala, an act that culminated in a methodical demographic change near the Iran-Iraq border.

It’s equally important to note that Mosul was a focal point for AQI, and though it was disbanded by the counterinsurgency operations in 2006-2008, its ideology did not perish. 

 

The law that placed the PMF under the central command of the Iraqi government and thus merged them into the Iraqi armed forces evinced the Iranian influence over the Shia cadres and proved once again that its influence is unchallenged. The PMF received the same benefits as their counterparts in the defense ministry and thus reinforced, now with more resources to their advantages, their separate identity. 

Such precarious resolutions only weaken the central command control and foment further sectarianism as the PMF enjoys a carte-blanche to access all realms since the PMF itself controls the Ministry of Interior, some divisions of the Iraqi army, and the FedPol. 

The US made a costly mistake by supporting Nouri Al Maliki (exiled for 24 years during Saddam’s tenure) and failed to see his corrosive and duplicitous policies that instigated intra violence. During his second term, Sunnis were highly targeted and persecuted. He retained personal control over the ministries of interior, intelligence and defense, and dismissed competent officers by hiring Shia loyalists. Nouri Al Maliki enabled Ali Younisi, former Iranian intelligence minister, to proclaim that “Iran has become an empire… and its current capital is Baghdad”.

 

Averting Chaos: the much-exalted CTS

The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) is “an independent, quasi-ministerial level organization separate from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior (MoI). Created by the U.S., it has a three-tiered organizational structure which includes the CTS headquarters, the Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC), and three Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigades.” It was funded by CENTCOM in 2004, and later the US Congress set the ISSF (Iraqi Security Forces Fund) to equip and train the ISOF.

Due to the lack of SOFA (status of forces agreement) after the US withdrawal in 2011, there was no legal immunity for the continued presence of up to 10,000 US military personnel who could continue and advise ISF. Therefore, between 2011-2012 there was only one advisor ascribed to the CTS. In my opinion, the lack of a SOFA expedited and exhilarated the speed at which ISIS captured Iraqi territories. 

The CTS’s mission is not to liberate cities from ISIS, but to work on preventing ISIL from appearing. However, because they were the most competent military force in Iraq, they led major battles against ISIL and took back most territories while suffering significant human losses. 

The small elite force, distant from key corrupt ministries whose allegiance is to militias, made it a much-exalted security force that all Iraqis respect and encourage. 

 

While Nouri Al Maliki was in power, he used the CTS as a “secret police force”, given that the CTS is under the PM’s command, away from MoD and MoI, and thus capable of pursuing the PM’s political interests. Consequently, the CTS faced shortcomings such as a lack of consistent salary payments, and wide opposition from MoD. Since 2010, Nouri Al Maliki has been blamed for dumping a consensus-building strategy in favor of focused power among his mostly Shia allies. 

 

Made to be non-sectarian and non-political, the CTS was faced with widespread loathing and lacked an official budget from the MoD, in addition to a lack of weapons, vehicles, and ammunition. By the end of 2011, and during Nouri Al Maliki’s tenure, the CTS saw a severe increase in politicization, as much experienced personnel was expelled and replaced with loyalists. The CTS was carved out of the traditional military culture of Iraq, which is mired in incompetence, corruption, and sectarianism. It’s important to note that the CTS had been waiting for a law to be passed by the Iraqi parliament to mesh into the MoD, to distance it from being an “extra-legal” organization and away from criticism. 

Given that it was the only effective force, it was inevitable that it’d be exploited and given unfitting missions. 

 

The US created the CTS which proved to be the most capable security force that was able to fight ISIS and retake territories previously occupied by ISIL. This elite and reputable organization is an exemplary force of how Iraqi forces ought to lead. Although it has suffered significant human losses, it proved itself as a reliable and competent security institution that does not tolerate sectarianism. Lt. Gen. Abdul Wahab al-Saad is a highly respected military figure in Iraq, akin to our very own late Francois El Hajj; men like them should navigate the country out of chaos and divisive ethno-sectarian rules and policies. Iraq has a flawed command system wherein several ISF units worked for different bureaus, supervisory organizations, and fiefdoms. 

Just like corruption was one reason why Beirut detonated on August 4th, corruption in Iraq could also be one reason why ISIL surfaced. 

 

The surge or appearance of ISIL can be linked to the sectarianism, oppression, and corruption of the post-2003 order in Iraq. Could the corruption, lack of meritocracy, and divisive sectarianism in the GoI have led to the rise of ISIS? Yes, and by all means yes.