Opinion Analysis by Gaia Bchara, Featured Writer

August 9th, 2021

Cuban protesters took to the streets on the 11th of July, 2021 in a move sparking international attention, solidarity, and even criticism. The reasons attributed to the eruption of the ongoing protests are multi-dimensional. The small island is witnessing a new COVID-19 wave and increased pandemic deaths, amid food, medicine, and oil shortages – previously heavily subsidized by Chavez’s Venezuela as food imports amount to approximately 70% of Cuba’s food - prompting the formation of queues for basic - now scarce – necessities, following power outages, devalued currency, hiking inflation, and a decrease in foreign investment. Prices of goods have soared by an estimated 500% to date, as foreign currency entering the island is squeezed by a fall of nearly 90% of activity in the tourism industry in the first five months of 2021 only. Despite the opening of shops allowing Cubans to buy essentials in dollars, a government decision to halt cash dollar deposits in Cuban banks has hindered the initiative. With dollar cash deposits representing the main source of remittances from expats abroad to their families, Cuban citizens have struggled to purchase available goods. This price increase was exacerbated by the Cuban government’s introduction of economic reforms in early 2021 which increased wages at the expense of prolonged and worsened inflation. The next few months do not seem to offer more hopeful prospects. Economists at the Pontificia Javeriana University of Cali in Colombia estimate a further price spike of up to 900% in the following months.

Now that the numbers are out of the way, the chief reason behind Cuba’s crisis remains heavily contested. One camp blames US sanctions, the other Castro’s legacy of authoritarianism, any discussion about Cuba will inevitably prompt both objections, and almost any subsequent argument tends to agree with one over the other. Let’s talk about sanctions and the making of democracies.

US sanctions have been imposed on Cuba since the uprooting of the US-backed Batista regime in 1959 and the Castro’s assuming of military and political power as Cuba’s new prime minister. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower executed an almost complete embargo on trade in Cuba – followed by a full embargo under Kennedy in 1962. A short reinstatement of diplomatic ties in 1977 was halted after the Regan administration’s 1982 designation of Cuba as a sponsor state of terrorism for its support of communist insurgencies in Africa and South America.

The 1992 fall of the Soviet Union prompted Bush’s Cuban Democracy Act, prohibiting US subsidiaries from trading in Cuba, US citizens’ visits to Cuba, family remittances, limiting the trade of US currency into Cuba, and threatening other countries against establishing trade relations with the island at the risk of losing trade relations with the US. Former President Clinton followed suit as he instates the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act which codified the US embargo on both financial and trade relations.

The Obama era signaled a major turning point on US-Cuban relations. Not only were travel and remittances restrictions eased, but diplomatic ties were also reinstated by lifting Cuba’s title of state sponsors of terrorism, the resumption of flights, and Obama’s historic visit to Cuba in 2016 as the first sitting US president to do so in almost 90 years. The Trump administration went on to reverse previous efforts, by removing staff from the US embassy in Cuba, expelling 15 Cuban diplomats from the US, announcing a wave of sanctions designed to weaken Cuba’s relations with Venezuela, and relisting Cuba on to its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The Biden administration now allows the export of food, medicine, medical equipment, and humanitarian goods. The wave of current protests has generated US sanctions over mass detentions and sham trials. In a statement, President Biden announces he is currently looking to make sure remittances go straight into the hands of relatives and to provide internet access to fight state censorship.

Now that we know how the sanctions evolved, who they impact, and what they consist of, let’s talk about their purpose. The logic of sanctions is to strong-arm the targeted party into adhering to desirable behavior. It is known that the US considers Cuba to be governed by an authoritarian regime that is unconcerned for the wellbeing of its people. In fact, Castro’s Cuba is labeled oppressive and actively harmful to the island’s democratic prospects. I’ll spare you the “whether Cuba is authoritarian or is it Western propaganda?” debate, and I’ll just agree with the first camp for the sake of the argument. Let’s suppose that the Cuban government is tyrannical by all means, and the US is looking to export the values of democracy and freedom to Cuba. The US’s preferred course of action for regime change? Sanctions.

Let’s look at the historical evidence of successful domestic topplings of authoritarian governments. Autocrats leave the office for one of three reasons: either by insider action i.e. military takeover or coup, natural death, or mass mobilization. The first option is the most common. The second is a force of nature. But what do we know of the preconditions that exist for the success of mass mobilization? Some of the most successful democratization experiences were realized in Southeast Asia, with lasting democracies still. Take South Korea for example. It is no fluke that the country experienced not only a massive economic boom, but also an exponential increase in GDP per capita, purchasing power, and GNP per capita. While South Korea’s democratization process can be divided into three phases starting in 1960 following the Korean War and lasting until its democratization in 1987, the illustrious quality of its last successful phase is the massive economic boom witnessed under Park Chung Hee’s regime, which, although intended to legitimize its rule, heightened expectations for democracy and provided its residents with the necessary knowledge and tools to invest adequately in the pursuit of public demands.

The sanctions impoverish the state-centered Cuban economy, whose consequences are borne by citizens unable to provide basic necessities. US foreign policy relies on the hope that the impoverished people of Cuba will rise against their oppressors, while simultaneously creating the conditions that disincentivize Cubans from revolting. Reduced access to food and remittances concentrates, rather than weakens, the government’s grip over the planning of the economy. Even when popular uprisings occur, such as the ongoing Cuban protests, their longevity is challenged by the day-to-day struggle of getting by.

What has, on the other hand, fueled Cuban protests is access to the internet and easier flow of information and organization between protesters, which then prompted the government to shut Cuba’s only internet provider in an effort to disrupt momentum. Who, you might wonder, provides network connection to Cuban protestors’ efforts in the first place? Venezuela. Yes, the very same country being sanctioned by the US has done more to fuel Cuban protests against the government than the US’s engagement has. Despite the first connection made from Cuba following the Cuban revolution having been established in 1996, the US embargo has not only generated a lack of access to the necessary equipment but also limited the cables running along the ocean floor that carry the island’s communication traffic. This has made it so that Cuba had its first fiber-optic connection to Venezuela in 2013, after which internet access has expanded under ALBA – 1, a joint project of $70 million dollars by Venezuelan and Cuban state telecom entities. Despite the 1,600 Venezuelan pipelines and as Venezuela’s economy deteriorates, economic and telecommunications sanctions prevent the expansion of internet access in Cuba. US companies capable of bringing about larger access are wary of dealing with the Cuban government, and US banks are increasingly reluctant to receive payments from Cuba.

It is clear that the US’s sanctions on Cuba have not deterred what the world hegemon considers a dictatorship. Successive US governments’ engulfment in the need to demonize communist regimes obstructs the actual fall of said regimes. Does the US want democracy in Cuba? Then the US should lift its economic and financial sanctions.