Opinion Analysis by Johnny Achkar, Featured Writer

June 17th, 2021

The illegal exercise of power and illegal power assumption has a lengthy history that stretches back to the Old Testament. A military coup, in our understanding, is the use of force by the regular armed forces or internal security forces to take control of the state's central executive. “A coup or attempted coup occurred once every 55 days in Africa (1960-1972),” according to Bertsch, Clark, and Wood (1978, 431). It would be an understatement to say that coups were fashionable. According to a more detailed analysis, the West African sub-region is the most prone to military coups (McGowan 1986). What makes this region so anemic to military seizures of power?

The truth of the matter is that West Africa has a coup problem, and it would be impolite of me to make broad generalizations. It is important to note that Senegal and Cape Verde are the two countries in West Africa that have never experienced a military coup and have maintained political stability since independence (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004). With its frequent military coups and violent government upheavals, West Africa is the world's most volatile area. This situation jeopardizes regional stability and poses a significant barrier to the sub-region’s long-term economic development. Furthermore, the resulting instability has consequences across the whole African continent, as well as the global north.

The political development theory is the first assumption. The central idea behind this thesis is that weak social and political institutions make a military intervention in the form of coups more likely. Mass citizen mobilization in the face of weak political institutions has caused a lot of friction. Benin, for example, has been through six military coups, five new constitutions, and 12 different heads of state in its first ten years of independence (Mwakikagile 2001).

The second theory deals with the military’s central role in politics; this can be found in many of these African countries. The third assumption is the notion of ethnic antagonism plurality, competition, and domination. Master Sergeant Samuel Doe’s military coup in Liberia was the consequence of ethnic pluralism and ethical dominance. Doe belonged to the Krahn ethnic group. He believed that the country's indigenous had historically played a minor part in society, which was controlled by descendants of the Americo-Liberian Pioneers.

The West African country of Niger provides an adequate example of how the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph may indicate the possibility of a coup d’état. During the period of 1974-2012, Niger suffered from numerous armed rebellions and coups. Beginning in 1974, the military gained significant sway and was able to impose its will on the country. Military spending increased from $476 per soldier per year to $5,500 per soldier per year (Correlates of War Project 2013).

With a strong sense of esprit de corps, the military became more resourceful and united. Despite the fact that the new regime's administration in 1974 included civilians in its cabinet, the military maintained great control over the country. The constitution, which was adopted in the last decade, requires parliament to authorize military spending and activities, although this procedure has yet to be fully implemented.

Throughout those past few decades, the population of Niger grew with the same ethnic groups, with the Hausa being the most populous. Ethnic animosity grew stronger, and tension was felt throughout the country. Internal strife persists between Arab-Berber nomads and black farmers, as well as between Djerma-Songhai and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groupings (Mwakikagile 2001, 125). With military authority in place, the country's Touareg rebel movement was sparked by a lack of regard for their claims of uneven treatment (Mwakikagile 2001). Most Touaregs who fled the country in the early 1970s returned in the 1980s with promises of relocation help from their government, but the aid never materialized in Niger. This, along with other issues, laid the foundation for the Touareg armed insurrection later on.

An autocratic system that was installed in 1974 stifled political involvement. This extended period of autocratic governance hampered the country's political development and harmed democratic institutions. Following the end of military control in the 1990s, a number of political parties arose. In 2011, new democratic institutions were built, but the issue of coup attempts remained. Although there has been a shift to multiparty competitive elections, other democratic aspects such as the formation of governmental institutions and structures that protect social and political rights, promote openness, and ensure accountability are still lacking (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

Having discussed the case of Niger, a contrastive example must be made. Thus, the West African country of Senegal presents an ideal exemplar. The nation did undergo a period of single-party rule under its first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor. The Senegalese president eventually relented and allowed four opposition parties (Gellar 2005). Nonetheless, on January 1, 1981, Senghor voluntarily stepped down and gave authority to his protégé, Abdou Diouf. Through quick promotions and special appointments, he set Abdou Diouf up to succeed him. Abdou Diouf retained Senghor's policy, but instead of the four opposition groups that Senghor had authorized, he permitted 14 to run in the 1983 elections (Gellar 2005). 

This was a significant improvement in the political climate and signaled the start of true democracy with public sovereignty. Senegal eventually developed a unique multiparty, democratic political culture, with over 72 political parties carrying the people's voice (Gellar 2005). Independent media of all kinds flourished, creating a platform for increased political engagement through free press and freedom of expression. All forms of media helped to broaden the scope of popular engagement and spreading the population's will throughout the country (Gellar 2005). 

The Senegalese military is mostly under civilian administration, with close connections to the French military that remains in the nation. Military spending is regulated by civilian authorities, who determine the military's demands as well as how and where the institution should be deployed. Military engagement in the country's affairs is purely dependent on the government's request, which is then approved by parliament to carry out a specified mission. (Agency for French Development 2013).

In conclusion, numerous factors affect the stability of West African nations and render them prone to armed takeovers. However, the main factors for this are tied to the weakness of democratic institutions and the suppression of a free press. As France represents the regional power in the region, they must ensure that firm steps are taken to repair the broken democratic system in countries such as Niger.