Conflict in the Sahel – the need for an antiracist approach to climate change
Security Analysis by Francesco Pitzalis, Staff Writer
August 4th, 2020
The "stability of modern societies relates strongly to the global climate".
The Sahel is a semi-arid transitory desert-jungle region spanning the breadth of the African continent. Sahelian countries have been plagued by protracted violent extremism since the droughts of the 1970s and 80s. Arguably, this has been propagated by a number of variables, including: climate change; malfunctioning state authorities; and tribal disagreements. The conflict is heavily entrenched, and the solution is far from straightforward. However, radical global change towards green energy would undoubtedly mitigate one of the long-term drivers of this conflict.
Since the droughts of the 1970s, changing weather patterns have visibly shaped the Sahel’s political dynamics. The Sahel ecosystem is highly sensitive to rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns. The region is projected to rise in temperature 1.5x faster than the global average .
Such radical climatic changes have provoked progressive desertification and poor nutrient regeneration. Consequently, conflicts typically arose between farmers and semi-nomadic herders vying for strained food resources. In previous years, these low-level tribal conflicts would have been quashed by clan leaders and order restored. However, a toxic combination of climate change, widespread corruption, governmental fragility, and illicit arms trafficking have allowed violent extremist networks to crystallise in the Sahel.
The Lake Chad Basin, bordering Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon is a pertinent example of climate change-induced conflict in the Sahel. Over-farming and climate change have reduced the water surface of lake chad by 90% since the 1960s (See figure 1). This has threatened the sustenance of over 30 million people and emboldened Islamist extremist insurgencies, such as Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). These groups exploited food insecurity and subsequent discontentment to build a support base for their movements. Divisions between semi-nomadic herdsmen and sedentary farmers competing for agrarian land were amplified by extremists. Semi-nomadic Fulani herdsmen are perhaps the most noteworthy example of an ethnic group sucked into Boko Haram’s vision of global jihad. These herdsmen were forced to move southwards into Nigeria’s “middle belt” following the Sahelian droughts of the 1970s and 80s. The Fulani have subsequently competed for resources with sedentary farmers and were denigrated by tribal conflict and preferential government peace-keeping. This made the Fulanis keen recruits for violent non-state actors, who utilised their support bases to violently seize the remaining food resources and control production and access. In essence, the food system became “weaponised” in the Lake Chad Basin. This exacerbated food insecurity, allowing violent non-state actors to further entice recruits and consolidate control.
Figure 1. Map of the Lake Chad Basin in 1972 and 2018. Source: UN.
The Lake Chad Basin demonstrates how conflict in the Sahel is endogenously exacerbated by the influence of climate change. However, the extent to which climate change incites such conflicts remains elusive. One article asserts that influence of climate change in Sahelian conflicts was being overemphasised amongst scientific experts.
The article’s author disputes the veracity of the dogma that climate change = food insecurity = conflict. Counterarguments to orthodox views include examples of regional conflicts where food is abundant. For example, in Béléhédé, Burkina Faso a development project augmented rice production and heightened tensions between various ethnic groups.
Likewise, expansion of arable land in the Sahel suggests that food scarcity may not be an issue.
These views characterise a rather superficial and panoptic interpretation of proceedings in the Sahel. Firstly, these views superimpose localised hot-spots of conflicts onto a region-wide issue. The example of Béléhédé may be somewhat analogous to throwing a couple of donuts into the middle of a school playground and expecting there not to be fist fights. Such examples are misleading and fail to acknowledge region wide food scarcity which may have centralised conflict about a single abundant food resource. Secondly, the notion of arable “expansion” in the Sahel lacks nuance in appreciating the role of over farming in compounding desertification and compromising sustainable food production.
Despite my disagreement with those who minimise environmental influences; government mismanagement and endemic corruption has undoubtedly permitted the weaponization of food systems by allowing extremists to exploit systems of patronage. Intriguingly, the agricultural regions where state authority is least noticeable are also the regions hardest hit by climate change. For example, the government of Nigeria exerts little formal authority in Borno state, a semi-arid Sahelian region with significant food scarcity. Unsurprisingly, Borno state became the principle stronghold of Boko Haram. It is therefore worth mentioning that Sahelian conflicts were self-contained by both climate change and governmental mismanagement. The two certainly go hand in hand.
Nevertheless, all experts concur that climate change is a factor in Sahelian conflicts to varying degrees. As such, we should thoroughly consider why the Sahel is not a keystone topic of mainstream climate activism. Typically, when a person reflects on climate activism, a polar bear, or perhaps the odd panda may spring to mind. Why don’t we think of the weaponization of food systems in the Lake Chad Basin, the forced-displacement of Fulani herdsmen or the rise of Boko Haram? It seems that the approach towards both antiracism and climate change is too often parcellated in discreet packages compatible to the increasingly common, pseudo-empathetic, Insta-activist. Similarly, why are the effects of climate change more frequently referenced in white-majority countries such as the Netherlands? Where are the nuances in our activism and our thinking? Too often the rise of violent extremists is seen as inherent backwardness and disconnected with global environmental phenomena, and by extension our own actions. This calls for antiracism reform in environmental activism and academia. Too often snow-ball headed academics speak of salvaging polar sea ice, without a second thought for soils. Soils are of equal importance in the fight against climate change and are being degraded in Africa at faster rates than any other continent on earth. It may be of surprise to you that soil can harbour three times more CO2 than air. Therefore, a focus on African soil-degradation/desertification will not only elucidate the symptoms of climate change but may also reveal possible solutions.
I am not calling for an over-simplification of the root causes of the Sahel conflict. I still maintain that short-term strategies, such as G-5 Sahel alliance should be employed to curb violent extremism. However, an unpalatable mixture of bombs and fighter jets can no longer be the single focus of Sahelian conflict resolution. Long term strategies must involve global efforts to reform energy systems. In my opinion, in order to bring real change to the fore, we must expand the debate on climate change beyond the grievances of Canadian polar bears.
Inspired by Professor Asmeret Asefaw Berhe