Opinion Policy Analysis Tala Majzoub, Staff Writer

March 21sst, 2021

On May 6th, 2018, nearly half of the Lebanese voting population cast their ballots to elect a new parliament for the first time in nearly a decade. Previously, the parliament had voted twice to extend its term in 2013 and 2014, listing concerns about the maintenance of national stability in the absence of a president. While the parliament is able to postpone elections under exceptional circumstances, activists and politicians argued that the circumstances after two extensions do not allow yet another delay – especially considering the two-year presidential vacuum in Lebanon. Yet, after deferring the elections for nearly a decade, the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, and Amal political blocs questioned the legitimacy of the electoral law, arguing that a state-wide proportional representation system would lead to a more representative result. Consequently, Lebanese legislators ratified a new parliamentary law on June 16th, 2017, and tentatively scheduled polls for May 2018. While the new Lebanese electoral law introduces few significant reforms, it actively reinforces the divisions that spark sectarian strife. The highly anticipated elections were governed by a proportional representation law intended to steer the country away from the traditional majoritarian system. However, rather than a rise in voter turnout, only 49.7% of the Lebanese population cast their ballots – a fairly modest turnout and nearly a 4% decrease from the 2009 elections. Lebanon’s parliamentary elections in 2018 also witnessed a total of 82,965 registered voters abroad, with no more than 46,799 Lebanese expatriates actually voting. Comparing these figures to roughly 4 – 13 million people of Lebanese descent worldwide, there exists a considerable political power within the Lebanese diaspora.

 

Looking Back: Clientelism, voter apathy, and attempts at rebranding overseas

Beyond its copious inadequacies, the new law was the first to allow Lebanese diaspora to vote from their countries of residency without having to travel to Lebanon, undoubtedly shifting the ways in which the diaspora will be engaging with the Lebanese government. Due to a number of historical controversies and political concerns, the true size of the Lebanese diasporic population remains fragmented and ambiguous, yet the political establishment has persistently utilized sectarian recruitment tactics overseas. The demographic numbers of the Lebanese, whether abroad or not, has long had major implications which can proportionately affect the country’s sectarian balance. Thus, figures have differed drastically depending on how the quantitative data is collected and assessed, and by whom. Nonetheless, De Bel-Air approximates that 885,000 eligible Lebanese voters reside overseas as of 2014. From the 885,000 migrants, 41% reside in the Gulf States; 23% in North America; 21% in Europe (including Norway and Switzerland); and 16% in other countries including Australia and Brazil. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the ruling class in Lebanon is fully cognizant of the vast power that the diaspora vote holds. 

 

Traditional political parties did not have to get too creative with their campaigning strategies beyond Lebanese grounds, as they continued to recycle the same old clientelist behaviors to garner diasporic votes. Shadi, 24, who lived in Europe at the time of the 2018 elections, said that a certain political party called him and asked if he would like to fly to Lebanon to vote for them: “They promised that they would handle all the travel costs, from A to Z. So, I agreed, since my parents are in Lebanon and they would be handling the expenses. I didn’t really know who they were, since I never really lived in Lebanon before.” Shadi adds that the political party offered him great monetary incentive to vote for their candidates, and he later realized that he wasn’t the only one that they had done this with: “Back then, I didn’t really care about anything – I saw an opportunity to travel to Lebanon for free and I took it. Then, when I traveled to Lebanon, I saw that I wasn’t the exception – they had been taking advantage of people living under dire financial situations and bribing them for votes”. With an estimate of 40% of voters subjected to vote buying, clientelism took many forms in 2018 – one of which was plane ticket buying as a campaigning strategy overseas. 

 

Besides promises of fully funded vacations to Lebanon, the political parties’ investments in the diasporic voter market also came in the form of mobile applications and advanced voting portals. The Lebanese Forces, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party facilitated voter engagement through advanced infrastructures within their official websites. Notably, the Lebanese Forces developed a mobile phone application to provide information on how to register and vote and how to network with other Lebanese Forces supporters to gather donations. The Free Patriotic Movement sustains its online websites by providing consistent updates and news on voting procedures and investments. Plainly, the political parties’ outreach to citizens residing in other countries paid off in some form of electoral advantage. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, who is also the leader of The Free Patriotic Movement, encourages investment and tourism in Lebanon by making frequent references to Lebanese expatriates. Although it has yet to be ratified by the Cabinet decree, Gebran Bassil also stated that there will be six parliamentary seats assigned for the diaspora in the forthcoming 2022 parliamentary elections, thereby granting migrants the political opportunity to benefit from policies generated by the Lebanese government. While the electoral law is crucial in determining the results of elections, the electoral behavior has an equal say in the outcomes – if not more. 

 

“We had lots of representatives from political parties, who guided voters to make sure they vote for the right list in the proper way. Independents did not have any sort of guidance to support their campaigns, they had very limited resources and very small space, so it was very hard to navigate if you weren’t being very careful,” says Kareem, 29, who was studying in London at the time. He tells The Phoenix Daily that the key reason why the political parties have been pushing for diasporic engagement is that most of the diaspora is Christian: “Unfortunately, the diaspora is not just Lebanese people living abroad. It could be much of the Christian diaspora who three or four generations ago have left the country. They are the ones whose only memory of the country is Bachir Gemayel and all these other people.” Kareem explains that the passed-on Lebanese citizenship that comes with generations of sectarian baggage “empowers many of the sectarian parties, whether or not they are in power at the moment”. Nevertheless, Kareem argues that “among the Lebanese immigrants who left the country recently or in the past decade, many of them, though not all, are definitely sick of the political parties which forced them out. So, if they are properly engaged in the voting process, they will probably vote for independents.”

 

While a big portion of the Lebanese diaspora remain hardcore supporters of political parties, the support obtained by independent lists in 2018 was significantly higher among the Lebanese diaspora than among the residents. The higher support for independent lists among the diaspora was present in all electoral districts, with 7.5% of emigrants voting for an independent list – the number being twice as high as that of resident voters (3.5%). The alliance between emerging anti-establishment political groups under the “Kulluna Watani” coalition found it much easier to attract funds from the diaspora. According to the study “Fighting Against the Odds: Emerging Political Actors in the 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections” conducted by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, interviewees from Kulluna Watani explained that the crowdfunding potential of the diaspora could have been tapped into by properly investing in the existing foreign networks within emerging groups as well. Kulluna Watani lacked the time to maximize these efforts yet recognized that recruiting team members from the diaspora could have unlocked ample fundraising potential. 

 

The 2018 parliamentary elections came after a long democratic void, but traditional political parties were quick to capitalize on the voter potential that the Lebanese diaspora harbors. They mainly targeted expatriates of loyalist decent and those with little to no political knowledge. Their resources allowed them to recycle clientelist behaviors, and to even rebrand themselves using advanced user-friendly technological infrastructures. While some people vote based on their sectarian beliefs or ideological convictions, many others support one party or candidate over another based on the services provided to constituents or the cash handed out on election day. Since the state institution has failed at implementing policies that make public goods available for everyone, citizens in Lebanon expect their MPs to provide targeted services such as jobs and other favors in return for their long-term support. This form of clientelism impedes democracy and development, creating an endless cycle of dependency on the traditional political parties, thus reinforcing voter apathy in the rest of the eligible voters around the world. When it came to elections, there appeared to be a distinct apathy among the Lebanese, arguably stemming from a resigned acceptance that whatever laws are implemented, the political balance is unlikely to change – ‘plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose’. However, the series of events over the past year, notably the October 17 uprising and the tragic August 4th explosion, bourgeoned a newly founded residential and diasporic awareness and connection to Lebanon, which holds the power to impact prospective parliamentary election results. 

 

Looking forward: Awareness, mobilization, and an electoral vacuum 

With the tentative parliamentary elections in 2022 comes the inevitable democratic upheaval suggesting a plausible delay in elections. Thoughts on the prospective electoral delay remain split, with oppositional movements maintaining varying perspectives on the legitimacy of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Lebanon. While the 2022 elections might be indefinite, one thing is for sure – the Lebanese diaspora has grown much more involved and engaged in Lebanese politics. A lot of this blossoming engagement could be attributed to the shifting diasporic demographics and social media activism.

 

The diaspora’s demographic structure has radically changed over the past year, with a handful recently becoming eligible to vote for the first time. Chloe Khattar, a researcher in Lebanese history and doctorate student at Cambridge University, clarifies: “The diaspora is so young in terms of demographics and is mobilized in Lebanon especially from the thawra onwards, during the crisis, during the explosion.” She continues to explain the critical role the internet community has played in mobilizing expatriates around the world: “I think the diaspora is aware of what is happening, it’s aware through the emergence of social media, and especially thanks to the zoom culture that has surfaced since Covid. I think this helps in spreading their presence abroad”. Khattar reflects on the voter turnout from past elections, saying that the forthcoming elections are a lot more promising: “If we increase this engagement, we will definitely have a better outcome. The diaspora is mainly a young diaspora, especially with the new wave of brain drain over the past month. Increasing their engagement will have a positive impact on the elections.” Her confidence in the new generation of migrants does not come out of the blue, with the diaspora stepping to the frontlines for monetary and medical aid after the August explosion.  

 

“The diaspora managed to bring global attention to the economic crisis in Lebanon, even if it's nowhere near being resolved in 2021. I think the October revolution was also a moment when many humanitarian and non-profit organizations were created or invigorated, and they laid the groundwork for the major role they would eventually play in the aftermath of the August 4th  blast,” says Dima Nasser, a PhD student in Comparative Literature and Arabic studies at Brown University. “I remember I ran a fever because of the intensity of being physically silent yet digitally so loud. I shared content left and right, about NGOs, food and supplies donations, open homes, survivors' stories. I remember I sent out impassioned emails to every philanthropic institution that I knew, begging for donations to help my people. Many responded positively. I begged my university community through rapid chain mail for donations to the Red Cross and a list of NGOs, and complete strangers I still hadn't met were kind enough to donate,” she recalls. However, while she acknowledges the diaspora’s key role in voting, Nasser is not too optimistic about the elections: “The fact that the political class (the only one Lebanon has ever known) has manipulated the constitution in its favor shows that no matter the outcome of any election, the seat designations will only shift slightly but no member will be voted out.” She adds that the electoral law requires level-headed attorneys with a comprehensive understanding of Lebanon’s legal history who are able to fight the legal battle, or else no amount of well-intended votes will lead anywhere. 

 

With the electoral prospects not looking too high, some political parties have not yet begun investing in campaigns. “Our party is not mobilizing for parliamentary elections. Our goal as opposition is not representation in a parliamentary façade. Our goal is to have a say in the de-facto transitional period that our society is witnessing as a result of state and economic collapse,” says Ibrahim Halawi, member of Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla (MMFD). “We also reject contributing to the reproduction of sectarian legitimacy through an election that sectarian leaders run, manage and predetermine, in return for token non-sectarian parliamentary seats for the opposition,” he continued. According to Halawi, MMFD prioritizes showing responsibility to the society instead of gambling on symbolic parliamentary representation: “The opposition has to advance its agenda for the transitional period, so that the transition does not conclude with a more dire political arrangement.” Where the diaspora is involved, Halawi explains to The Phoenix Daily the thin line between meaningful diasporic engagement and participation that might be counterproductive: “If the Lebanese expatriates are eager to be represented in the parliament, then indeed it should mobilize itself with the opposition seeking such symbolic gains in a sectarian system that both the opposition and the diaspora know is not run through parliamentary politics,” he says. “However, if the Lebanese expatriates want to have a meaningful and historical role in this de-facto transitional period, then they should organize with, or support, the political opposition that is presenting a serious, sensible, and comprehensive plan for the transitional period”.

In contrast, other political opposition movements, like the National Bloc, place more faith in the parliamentary elections and have already started mobilizing in Lebanon and beyond. “The only viable way for us to achieve political change is through parliamentary elections. We don’t believe in violence or war for political reform.” says Mohamad Serhan, a field coordinator of the National Bloc. “Our priority is to reach governmental positions through elections, since it is the only democratic way to elect officials who will help rebuild the country” he adds. Serhan continued to explain their campaigning strategies, such as raising awareness on political alternatives and revitalizing civil engagement. He also flags out the responsibility that the Lebanese diaspora has in terms of campaigning, networking, and lobbying for oppositional movements in Lebanon. Yet, Serhan insists on the importance of cooperating with different electoral campaigns to reach a larger audience abroad: “We plan to mobilize the diaspora not under ‘national bloc’, but rather we believe that all opposition movements should collaborate as much as possible to utilize the efforts existing outside Lebanon. In Lebanon, different parties might not get along, but on the international level, they should work together in order to unite a greater number of people”. 

 

With that, the electoral forecasts for 2022 remain foggy, with the sectarian electoral law being subject to heavy scrutiny. The country has seen the largest disappearance of wealth per capita in modern history and continues to witness the end of subsidies and a drastic Lira downfall – questions about the performativity of parliamentary elections are bound to arise. The good news is that the Lebanese diaspora seems to be a lot more proactive and a lot less willing to compromise. Many people have already started joining and learning about oppositional political parties. Nonpartisan digital campaigns like “SAWTI” are already available to inform, engage, and mobilize Lebanese citizens everywhere. Whether or not the parliamentary elections are the solution, it is clear that the solution will be political: this means sharing posts and stories on social media; joining, organizing, and supporting alternative political groups and spreading awareness among expatriate networks and connections and raising funds. 

 

The Lebanese diaspora has long been the guardian angel of the Lebanese economy throughout history, but today I argue that it will play a role in shaping that history. While clientelist behavior also dominated the electoral landscape beyond Lebanese grounds in 2018, any expatriate with a marginal understanding of the complete collapse in Lebanon knows that the real split is no longer between March 14 and March 8; it’s between the people and the corrupt political establishment that stole their money. Voting is a democratic civic duty, but when your country has never known true democracy, you can only hope, act, and work towards achieving honest constitutional elections. The increased diasporic political mobilization paired with the emergence of accessible independent electoral platforms holds the power to impact the parliamentary elections outcomes – and that power must be harnessed. Until then, the Lebanese diaspora will continue to build a life elsewhere, while violently grappling the unresolved feelings towards their country. 

This article is published as part of the SawtixThe Phoenix Daily Partnership.

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