Opinion Analysis by Zeina Dagher, Staff Writer

September 12th, 2020

The October 17th protests were a definite step in the right direction for the Lebanese people, who, for the first time in a long while, have united against the ever-ruling corrupt political class demanding the bare necessities of life. However, as time and events progressed, one pivotal question became increasingly pressing: what is the October 17thmovement’s proposed plan of action? What vision do they have of the Lebanese state’s future? Up to this day, there hasn’t been any official report bearing the voice of October 17th, uniting all or most the groups active within the movement, and ratified by the people. However, many voices, from both October 17th and the political parties in power, are demanding today Lebanon becoming a secular state, and giving up the confessionalist system (each demanding details to be discussed later). But is confessionalism the real problem in Lebanon? Is it what’s obstructing the implementation of effective reforms? 

Let’s first start by defining political confessionalism. It is a system that entails distributing political and institutional power proportionally among confessional communities (aka religious sects). Lebanon counts 18 religious communities, that all participate in the exercise of power, either through the Constitution, or through Constitutional conventions. The Constitution itself, particularly its article 24, provides for an equal distribution of parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims, proportionally amongst the different sects within the two, and amongst the different Lebanese regions. All of the other confessional distributions of seats stem from Constitutional conventions, that are written in the Taef agreement. These distributions include: the tripartite distribution of the three presidential seats between Christian Maronite, Sunni, and Shiaa, the distribution of the highest-ranking public sector jobs (فئة اولى) between the different sects, and the distribution of all other public jobs “following the national agreement” – a rather ambiguous condition that’s caused conflicts in the appointment of different public officials. 

Political confessionalism has not always been the case in Lebanon. From the 16th century to the 19th century, Lebanon was not under a confessionalist political system, but rather a sort of feudal system called “iktaa” (اقطاع), implemented by the Ottoman State. This system was based on social classes rather than religious affiliations: the feudal lords were rich and the peasants poor, and in both could be found various religious affiliations (Druze, Christian maronites, Christian orthodox, Sunnis and Shiaas). Political considerations were stronger than confessional ones: whenever feudal lords would compete for more power, little parties would form from the lowest ranks of the system and up, transcending religious affiliations and centered around a purely political idea. As the regional political situation progressed, and international powers started intervening more within the Ottoman Empire, power relations between different feudal families changed, consolidated by religious affiliations and backed by different international powers. Preceded by the implementation of social confessionalism by the Ottoman State in the region, political confessionalism was introduced for the first time under the regime of Shakib Afandi in the 19th century. Official texts in Lebanon provided for a confessional representation in politics through the distribution of seats (political, administrative and judiciary) among the main confessions in Lebanon, a system that has survived until this day.

During the October 17th protests, and up until now, many popular chants consistently demand the fall of this confessional system, and for it to be replaced with a secular state, where appointments are based purely on merit. Indeed, protestors believe the confessional system has only divided the people more, created animosity between the sects, and helped the implementation of clientelism and a deeply-ingrained “leader” culture (زعيم) that has only ever repressed the people. These demands are also backed by the text of the Constitution: article 24 states that the confessional distribution of parliamentary seats is adopted, “awaiting the elaboration by Parliament of a non-confessional electoral law.” Also, section h of the Lebanese Constitution’s preamble states that “the suppression of political confessionalism is a national and essential goal for which it is necessary to work following a plan by steps,” on which article 95 elaborates. Additionally, many demand a secular state or the complete separation of religion and state, inspired by western political systems seen as the epitome of modern and rational politics, and convinced by the success and continuous peace and stability that the western world enjoys. 

However, nowhere is confessionalism truly absent. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center has divided countries following what their respective Constitutions say about religion. In theory, the countries’ positions towards religion can be summed up in 4 categories: the ones that have an official state religion, the ones that have a preferred or favored religion, the ones that have no official or preferred religion, and the ones that are hostile to religious institutions. In practice, the situation almost always discreetly differs. For example, France is known to be a secular state that has no official or favored religion. However, the French Presidents have always been Christian, and particularly catholic, with very few exceptions that date back to the early stages of the French Republic’s formation. Today, a protestant or orthodox politician has little to no chance of becoming President, although the French Constitution grants the opportunity to everyone. The same can be said about the United States, that also fit into the category of no official or favored religion. The vast majority of US Presidents were Christian protestant, with the one exception of John F. Kennedy, who was catholic, and a handful of Presidents who were nontrinitarian Christians. 

Most countries in the west didn’t have much problems establishing themselves as secular states because they are religiously homogeneous, after having conducted numerous massacres against certain religious groups throughout history. France eliminated protestants in the Saint Barthelemy massacre in 1572, the US and other European countries (Britain, Spain) eradicated tens of millions of indigenous individuals during the colonial era (colonies that are today established countries like Canada and Australia), Germany’s Nazis exterminated the 2/3rds of Europe’s Jews… And Muslim immigrants and refugees don’t yet make up threatening numbers for western countries’ religious demographics today. This is to say that, the only reason Lebanon finds itself “different” or more complicated than other countries in its religious components, is that no religious group in it has tried, and succeeded, in completely exterminating the other. Had Europe not conducted all these massacres, it probably would have found itself with a similar confessional political system. 

Even if you removed confessionalism completely from the Lebanese political system, the root of the problem remains: clientelism. Let’s take the example of the US. Although the country does not follow a confessional political system, its rank on the Transparency corruption index has been dropping to reach 23/198 in 2019. That is because powerful lobbies during elections create a sort of clientelist relation between the President-to-be and lobbyists, where the President offers them services and benefits in return of them funding his campaign. Clientelism can also be found in the administration, where officials are nominated by the President (Cabinet members, White House staff…). They are therefore not picked on a merit base, but are rather given the job in return of their ultimate compliance to him. In Lebanon, “clientelism is not merely a common practice in the country, it is a virus that has spread through every artery of the state, from the business sector to the justice system, through education and administrations across the country. It has thrived on the inability of the state to provide basic services to its citizens, a factor that has become one of the main causes of its dysfunction,” according to L’Orient-Le Jour. Indeed, confessionalism is an added virus to the already existing one. “It works like a mafia system. To get a service normally offered by the state, you often have to go through the politicians of your sect," said a mayor in Chouf interviewed by OLJ, who wished to remain anonymous. But if clientelism is not resolved, by, generally speaking, strengthening the state, the same mafia leaders will find other ways to divide the people within a secular state, other than their religious affiliation/geographical location of individuals. The independence of the judicial system from politicians is crucial in the fight against clientelism and corruption. “In the last [judicial] appointments, political parties within each sect ranked the judges from the most loyal to the least loyal. They don’t just want people who are close to them and who can help them, they want them to be of service to them,” said a mid-career judge to OLJ. The administration also needs to become completely independent from politicians. All in all, there are many successful mechanisms adopted in other countries, that can block any attempt at creating clientelist relations between politicians and individuals/state officials. They are no secret to professionals, and can be easily implemented if the will was found.

Having removed all possibilities of creating a clientelist system within the state, a confessional political system wouldn’t be a threat if we worked on nationalism: Lebanon first and Lebanon only, everything else (religious affiliation among others) coming after. This process starts early in an individual’s mind, through thoroughly learning the country’s history in school, that all confessions collectively helped create, and the richness that comes with having a plurality of sects. Hate speech based on confession would be criminalized, being against the country’s unity, as well as any speech denying the Lebanese state’s sovereignty and prioritizing any cause over Lebanon (say, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party’s cause…). 

Confessionalism as we see it today has many drawbacks and disadvantages. Yet, a secular state may not be the solution everyone awaits, because clientelism would still exist in one form or another, and contrary to popular belief, no first-world country has accepted to give up its religious identity for a completely secular state – so why should we? In the end, we all want what’s best for Lebanon first and foremost, and in times so critical, it’s very important to be aware and engage in all discussions happening around us, in order to figure out what best would suit the Lebanese people before anything else.