Opinion piece by Myriam Akiki, Staff Writer

March 15th, 2021

In her dystopian novel series “The Hunger Games”, American author Suzanne Collins tells the story of Panem, a country divided into 13 districts, varying in poverty and exploited by the wealthy Capitol.

Familiar much?

While the Lebanese scenario doesn’t involve a literal fight to the death -yet (we hope)- it surely bears resemblance, on many levels, to Collins’ story, especially in dividing the population by districts, or in the Lebanese case, by sects. It is rare and uncommon to find a Lebanese who has not at least once in a lifetime, found themselves making the connection between a fellow Lebanese’s first name or last name, or even place of birth, and the confession they may belong to in the attempt of eventually trying to guess what their political views may be. Being defined by your religion or sect is so rooted in the Lebanese identity that even those who try to break from it have somewhat created their own “19th sect”.

Now, having this sense of belonging to a certain religious group isn’t essentially bad in itself. It’s the sectarianism which has consequently emerged that is problematic. So what is this sectarianism we always talk about?

How did it come to be and why can’t we seem to be able to break from it? Is it time we move on?

Sectarianism is, by description, excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially a religious sect. This excessive attachment has been ever persistent since the early days of the Lebanese Republic. 

While pursuing the Lebanese independence in 1943, then-President Bechara Al Khoury and then-Prime Minister Riad Al Solh came to an unwritten agreement called the National Pact. This agreement institutionalized the already present sectarian divisions. It distributed primary power positions between the sects, as we know them today: Maronite President, Sunni Prime Minister, and Shia Speaker of Parliament, along with other positions too. In an attempt to build a new nation, this National Pact, in fact, laid the foundation for further division as the years passed and demographics changed.

Eventually, the Lebanese civil war erupted, ultimately leading to the Taif Agreement in 1989. The Taif Agreement was a tool to end the nearly fifteen years of war, yet it reasserted the sectarian power-sharing, with modifications to suit the changed Lebanese demographics, further widening the division in various sense of the word.

The Lebanese Constitution was later amended in 1990, with Article 95 stating in its newest form that “The Chamber of Deputies that is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to bring about the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee shall be formed and shall be headed by the President of the Republic; it includes, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political intellectual and social figures. The task of this Committee shall be study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers, and to follow up the execution of the transitional plan.”

Thirty years later, regardless if it was worded in goodwill or simply performative, Article 95 has become a headline for activists that seek the end of sectarianism in Lebanon. For one reason or another, the National Committee mentioned in the article has yet to see the light. “Wijhet Nazar” does a good job at explaining the issue on their platform: from a political point of view, we have already seen many constitutional breaches, so why don’t we breach Article 95 and move past political confessionalism without the National Committee required by the article? The answer is, of course, that getting rid of political confessionalism does not suit the people in power.

That is to say, it would be wrong to assume that sectarianism has persisted to this day, only because of legal texts. If the Constitution and Taif Agreement were to be amended today, or if we were to apply Article 95, would sectarianism, in its rough meaning, cease to exist?

Going back to the definition of sectarianism, we can say it is a “condition” in its essence. It is not merely word on paper, but rather a feeling, an “excessive attachment to a sect” in the minds of people. This excessive attachment draws from multiple factors, namely emotions. And these emotions can vary between superiority (when one sect believes it is superior to the others), fear (of being ruled or controlled by someone other than one’s own), indignation (sometimes one sect’s resentment towards another is based on the latter’s actions towards a third sect) and the list goes on. 

All these emotions have been festering amongst the Lebanese population for a long time. The civil war was a direct result of these sentiments. What happened was that the war lords of the civil war took advantage of these emotions, fed on them and then fed them right back to the people, thereby maintaining their power and strengthening the wheel that has been spinning since the National Pact. 

Today, the Lebanese mindset seems to be shifting, but we still have a long way to go to abolish sectarianism. A Lebanese citizen would tell you that he has no problem coexisting with his fellow citizen from another sect but he will surely not go and vote for a candidate of that other sect when elections time comes. Lebanese people need to embrace the diversity in order to really break from sectarianism.

Ripping out sectarianism from its roots is a difficult task. The foundation for equality between different sects has to be laid first. To do this, it might be wise to start by giving up all that which sectarianism offers, starting from clientelism to corruption to the outdated political leaders who have entrapped the Lebanese in their schemes for far too long. Because laws are the mirror of society, it does not matter what the Constitution or any other text says right now. The people have to change their mindset first, and the rest will follow.

Lebanese religious leaders do not actually thrive for sectarianism. Rather, their speeches always encourage a unified and nationalist society. So really, the issue is more political than it is religious. And political solutions in this case are simple: popular uprisings/revolutions or elections.

In Collin’s novels, elections were not an option. So, the districts, being so deprived from their basic human rights, so overworked and hungry, took the first chance they could at starting a revolution. The richer districts that were more privileged ended up joining the others and all of them, a united front lead by the Mockingjay, overthrew the oligarchist Capitol. 

The Lebanese, on the other hand, have the two options in the palm of their hands. So let us have our own kind of “revolution” - a slow inner one but a sure one - not only in hope that a Mockingjay of our own pops up but also in hope that the upcoming elections, whenever they may happen, prove to be pivotal.