Biden’s Iraq Policy, or Lack Thereof
Opinion Foreign Policy Analysis by Reem El Dana, Staff Writer and Naif al Rogi, Staff Writer
February4th, 2021
On the 20th of January 2021, Joseph Robinette Biden was sworn in as the 46th President of the United States of America. On the 21st of January of that same year, two suicide bombers set off in Baghdad, killing at least 32 people and leaving many more injured in what was a rare and brazen strike at the heart of the city – ISIS has since claimed responsibility for the attack. The Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was quick to blame factions that would have the US extend its presence in Iraq, a country Iran would rather have all for itself.
President Joe Biden has been a key player in the relationship development between Iraq and the US. As the chair of the Foreign Relations Committee in 2002, he was known for committing the “original sin” by endorsing the 2003 invasion, yet he was among the advocates who supported the US troop withdrawal in 2011. Biden is known for the tripartite project that sought to divide Iraq into three cantons based on sectarian attributes: a canton each for Kurd, Sunni, and Shia. He compared ethno-sectarian Iraq to Bosnia, and as a result of his recommendation, the Iraqis remember him as “صاحب مشروع التقسيم”, or progenitor of the ‘partition project’. There is little reason to believe that the project, coughed up when America had more than 150,000 troops in the country as opposed to today’s roughly 2,500, will resurface as a core component of the Biden administration’s Iraq policy. In fact, the realities on the ground in 2021 are completely unrecognizable from what they were in the mid-2000s. Americans are wary of the word ‘Iraq’, and the Americans in Iraq are largely confined to the American embassy in Baghdad, which admittedly also happens to be the world’s most expansive, nearly the size of Vatican City.
In the lead-up to the one-year memorial of Qassim Soleimani’s assassination, the outgoing Trump administration withdrew personnel from the embassy, in a move that only bolstered rumors that Washington was considering permanently downsizing or abandoning its diplomatic commitments in Iraq. The newly-cemented Biden administrationseems to have put Iraq on the back burner, its policy not yet fully thought out.
Despite Bidens’ checkered record in Iraq, his slant on changing landscapes is known to be through working on the insideand maintaining strong bonds. As VP and the official in charge to end the war in Iraq, he made 64 calls to Iraq when Obama only made 4. He established solid relations with Iraqis, to the extent where affirmations like “Biden was morecomfortable working with us than the president was” were predominant amongst Iraqis.
Given the return of democrats to the administration, Iraqis fear that a Biden administration might not subside the unrelenting Iranian influence over Iraq and the ensuing quashing of gains that the October Revolution of 2019 achieved. Nonetheless, Biden will not implement a new Middle East policy; he’ll pick up disentangling from endless wars andreturn to great-power competition. However, doing less in the Middle East means diplomacy will be restored while being absent during Trump’s tenure. The restoration of diplomacy will bring respite to Iraq on the Iranian front, as Biden expressed interest in rejoining the JCPOA, and on the national front as the US continues to support Iraq in implementing reforms and fighting corruption via the Iraq-US strategic talks.
The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq ought not to signal its defeat against Iranian-backed militias because it is in no way close to that. Although it may signify a more dangerous security and power vacuum, the Biden administration must ensure that Iraqi state sovereignty and monopoly of violence reign with the state. Iranian-backed militias and an ISIS resurgence remain top security threats for Iraq. The options for Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kathimi are limited since Iraq is mired in socioeconomic and health crises; what may help is strengthening its ties with the Gulf, and curbing paramilitaries' influence that weakens the central authority.
The US begins to achieve its foreign policy goals when it can impulsively rely on its allies to preserve security in the region. Reengaging with the country to contain Iran, perhaps in concert with recent Saudi efforts to balance out Iranian influence, seems a safe bet.
Lloyd Austin, the new defense secretary and former general in charge of all US troops in Iraq, expressed the new administration’s desire to maintain up the status quo, retaining the 2,500 soldiers for now. President Trump on the other hand, had notably wanted a near-complete withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan before leaving office, with only 500 eyed to remain in the former. Austin suggested during his confirmation hearing that this would serve counterinsurgency efforts, and the twin suicide bombings give new force for that purpose. Perhaps what has been left unsaid, in light of American (and arguably Iranian) hopes of limited rapprochement, is that the American presence might be the only thing standing in the way of a complete Iranian takeover of Iraq.