Italy and Lebanon continued: decentralisation as a governing principle

Mar 25

Analysis by Francesco Pitzalis, Staff Writer

March 25th, 2021

Italy and Lebanon have hitherto called upon “technocratic” governments to solve their respective crises. Whilst we have highlighted the successes of Mario Monti’s government; technocratic governments nevertheless incur several hidden risks.

Firstly, technocracies provide a reprieve for the elected officials responsible for failings in governance. The installation of unelected experts transfers culpability to the technocrats without shifting the balance of power in parliament. Thus, the politicians at fault are not removed from the political gene pool. Likewise, the systems facilitating the decline are not modified.

Alas, elected officials across the Mediterranean have assumed longevity of Pharaonic proportions. For example, Silvio Berlusconi retained political influence after he sunk the Italian economy and Mario Monti saved the country’s skin. “L’immortale” (the immortal) Berlusconi is currently readying an Italian Presidential campaign amid countless corruption and sex scandals. This overt lack of accountability disconnects the ordinary citizen from the political class. The result is a distrust in democracy and electoral fatigue.

The goal, therefore, should be systematic change rather than technocratic. Solutions must end the monopoly of ministries on public expenditure, expose corruption and patronage, increase political accountability and reduce electoral fatigue. For Lebanon, systematic political change should also mend its ailing infrastructure.

Decentralisation

I propose decentralisation as a governing principle for Italy and Lebanon. This entails fiscal decentralisation and devolution of administrative powers to sub-national governments. Decentralisation must also involve the concept of subsidiarity – the smallest possible unit capable of performing a task should do so. Central governments should be retained for matters of national concern, including defence, foreign policy and internal security.

We begin the conversation by discussing successful models of decentralisation: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. All are constitutional monarchies organised on a decentralised basis. For example, in Denmark, 71% of Danish GDP is spent in sub-national authorities; 49% in municipalities and 22% in regions. Expenditure is predominantly financed by local taxation and is supplemented by government grants to minimise local inequalities.

The Scandinavian model differs from the frequently cited “Swiss model”, as regions are not federalised on an ethnic, religious or linguistic basis. Likewise, the Scandinavians employ robust taxation to provide services for their citizens rather than a tax-haven for Formula 1 drivers and Lebanese/Italian politicians. Additionally, these services are organised bottom-up according to the demands of each municipality. Any service that the municipality cannot provide is elevated to the regional or central government. The result is a robust and efficient infrastructure with a high degree of accountability. This has made the Nordic states global leaders in measures of human development, tertiary education, and most importantly, democracy.

The Scandinavians have long been sceptical of centralised nation states. This was notably expressed in the work of Danish philosopher, Hal Koch. Koch advocated that democracy is first a conversation and then a vote. If everything is centralised, impactful conversation between communities and local officials is muted, thus accountability lacks immediacy. In Italy and Lebanon, challenging authority requires a confrontation with the central government; which inevitably is a more formidable task.

At this point the reader should note that the benefits of decentralisation are cross-cultural. This was elucidated by the construction of a “decentralisation index” for 182 countries by the World Bank. The results are as follows; countries with a higher decentralisation index were associated with higher GDP/capita, lower incidence of corruption and stronger democratic institutions. Intriguingly, the authors claimed that the index was an accurate predictor for countries that were “ripe for popular people revolt”, such as those encompassing the Arab spring.

The remaining questions now focus on how centralisation has failed in Italy and Lebanon. Additionally, we will explore decentralisation in Italy and Lebanon as a system to combat corruption and patronage, increase democratic participation, reduce imbalances in political culture, and increase the provision of services.

Italy

Local self-governance is enshrined in the Italian constitution. However, whilst decentralised on paper, Italy is an example of how not to build a state from the bottom up. In Italy, 29% and 10% of total government expenditure is spent on regions and municipalities respectively. This is by no means Nasser’s Egypt, but pales in comparison to the localist approach seen in Scandinavian states.

The reader may also notice that the majority of sub-national expenditure is guzzled up by the regions. These regions in many cases, are larger than the state of Lebanon and wield significant administrative influence on the central government. The outcome of this region-focused devolution is a soap opera of inter-regional cat fights over central funding. The ordinary citizen unfortunately, still fails to exercise democracy within his community.

There is another pressing issue. The Presidents of regional governments represent political movements in the central government. They are therefore not representatives of their constituents but agents of the state. For example, President Solinas of Sardinia, is allied with the Lega Nord and thus enacts the policies of his right-wing allies. This is far from decentralisation and instead divides Italy based on political alignments. True decentralisation (Scandinavian style) shifts the debate down a notch to the local level. Thus, municipal debates exist on issues such as the height of your neighbour’s fence, rather than right vs left. Naturally this increases national cohesion, a luxury severely lacking in our two countries being discussed.

Regional governance of in Italy has also failed to minimise the inflated public services sector. Why might that be advisable? Well… Italy has consistently ranked amongst the most corrupt countries in the Eurozone and guess what? The majority of public embezzlement occurs through the public services sector.

Combatting corruption really spells out a key benefit of localism in both Italy and Lebanon. If funds are kept within municipalities, they are far more traceable. Correspondingly, Failure to deliver appropriate services can be blamed primarily on local officials who are in close proximity to their constituents. This is an incredible way to maintain accountability, given local politicians risk a flip-flop to the skull from an Italian or Lebanese grandmother (quite the deterrent, believe me).

Lebanon

Lebanon has also suffered from a pumped-up centralised state. Estimates suggest that a mere 5% of government expenditure is spent at the local level. This is in direct contravention to devolution stipulated in the 1989 Taef agreement and the 1977 Municipal act. Since the 1990s, the state ministries sucked up funds from municipalities, permitting politicians to skim money off the top without a second thought. As we all know, this has spelled disaster for Lebanon’s infrastructure. A shocking example of this was the garbage crisis of 2015. Instead of municipalities collecting rubbish, Lebanese government officials preferred to line their pockets from lucrative nation-wide contracts with private enterprises. Once a kink emerged in the grand operation it all fell apart, leaving the Lebanese to inhale garbage for breakfast. Ironically, municipalities alleviated the crisis by reassuming garbage collection at the last minute. Despite flaws in municipal services due to lack of funding, you can bet your last fresh dollar that municipal services are more efficient. Not only because of accountability previously mentioned but simply because local leaders know their areas better. Ibn (+bint) al balad biyaarif aktar.

Services in Lebanon require some extra thought; given their near-universal deficiencies. Let us consider electricity, or lack thereof. The state utility, Électricité du Liban (EDL) supplies only 63% of the country’s required electricity. These deficiencies are underpinned by high technical and non-technical losses (corruption), resulting in daily blackouts. The Lebanese are thus forced to hire private diesel generators from local mafiosos in order to keep the lights on. Besides hyper-capitalising the Lebanese energy market; private diesel generators contribute to respiratory problems, environmental degradation and 40% of Lebanon’s CO2 emissions. Further, the mafiosos are affiliated with sectarian politicians at the top, so the vicious cycle continues. In essence, there is only the corrupt, clientelist state and the individual fending for his or herself.

The ministry of energy, meanwhile, shifts accountability onto political adversaries whilst vowing to fulfil pie-in-the-sky promises of fossil fuel discovery and grand renewable-energy projects. Of note, the infamous Bisri dam would’ve desecrated the Bisri Valley ecosystem, risked large cost overruns and of course, be subject to untracked embezzlement by government officials (as is the case with EDL). The dam was the brainchild of former energy-minister Gebran Bassil, who fails to recognize that a lack of enormous dams or natural gas is not the problem. The problem is undoubtedly Bassil’s overinflated former ministry, that lacks accountability, administrative efficiency and is subject to corruption and patronage.

That brings us to the mysterious case of Zahle; the only city in Lebanon where the lights stay on. In Zahle, the municipality leveraged a century-old law to independently provide electricity for the city and 16 surrounding villages. In contrast to EDL, Électricité de Zahlé (EDZ) provides electricity 24/7. Likewise, EDZ experiences only 5% technical losses and collects 100% of taxes. Why is that the case? Simply speaking, the authority providing electricity is closer to its people. This fosters trust within the community and accountability within local governance. Additionally, EDZ’s size enables greater flexibility than the national grid in determining its energy mix. For example, solar panels account for 10% of EDZ’s energy output. In comparison to the Bisri Dam, the solar panels are discreet, efficient, approved by the locals and effective. I think we are getting the idea here.

In closing, decentralisation has proven effective cross-culturally in limiting systemic corruption, increasing political accountability and efficiency of state infrastructure. These are key variables that are crucial for the progression of Lebanon and Italy. Nonetheless, I must be clear that I am not trying to reduce the problems faced by Italy and Lebanon onto a single centralisation-decentralisation paradigm. Further, I am not denying the need for the removal of corrupt politicians, as advocated for in the Lebanese revolution. Despite this, I have found myself becoming increasingly disenchanted with the revolution’s strategy. The protest group have not provided a unifying solution except for the resignation of the political class. Sure, you can put a few kleptocrats in jail but then what? As long as the systems enabling abuse of power are not crushed, very little will change. Moreover, as long as power remains concentrated at the top, a three-way culture war will be perpetuated amongst the ruling elite. If power percolates down to the municipality, the politicisation of Lebanon’s controversial national identity is rendered obsolete. Indeed, bottom-up states engage in hard-fought battles over lawnmowers rather than the Christian “blocking third”. You want your government to work for your people? You start from the bottom up.

References

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