Putin, Navalny, and Russian Democracy - Between means and ends
Opinion Analysis by Gaia Bchara, Featured Writer
April 20th, 2021
Alexei Navalny’s rise within Russia’s political scene has made headlines around the world. Navalny is a Russian anti-corruption, anti-Kremlin critic, activist, politician, and former presidential candidate. Most recently, Navalny scored himself a new title: prisoner. In fact, many would argue that Navalny classifies as a political prisoner of Putin’s authoritarian regime. While this has gained him enormous support both domestically and in the West, many still question his viability as a potential alternative for the country’s leadership.
But first, who’s Alexei Navalny?
Navalny made his way into to political scene first in 2000, upon joining the Russian United Democratic Party, from which he was expelled in 2007 for ultra-nationalistic tendencies. After being assigned policy advisor to Kirov’s governor in 2009, Navalny leaks documents of a $4 billion embezzlement arrangement at Transneft, the state-owned oil pipeline operator. In 2011, he founded the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) to investigate malpractice within Russian state institutions. Since then, he has been arrested and jailed on a number of occasions; in 2013, he was found guilty on charges of embezzlement and was sentenced to five years, then released overnight on appeal following public protests. Later that year, Navalny was accused of fraud, found guilty in 2014 and given a three-and-a-half-year sentence, which was later suspended on conditions of monthly checkups with Russia’s prison service until December 30th, 2020. He was also placed on house arrest, which he brokein 2015. In 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled his 2013 convictions illegitimate due to the lack of a free trial. Nevertheless, the subsequent retrial upheld his sentence. In the same year, Navalny announced his run for the 2018 Russian presidency, which was labelled ‘politically motivated’. The Central Election Commission banned him from running due to his prior record. Soon after, FBK – which funds his endeavors – was shut down.
It wasn’t until 2020, however, that Navalny caused a large-scale international buzz.
On August 20th, 2020, Navalny fell into a coma as a result of poisoning during a flight from Siberia to Moscow. He was then moved to the German Charité Hospital in Berlin where the medical diagnosis revealed that the poisoning from a Novichok chemical nerve agent, which was developed in the Soviet Union, and employed two years earlier on Russian spy Sergei Skripal. To exacerbate things further, Bellingcat – an investigative group – reported on an elite team within Russia’s Federal Security Service that has been trailing Navalny since at least 2017. The Kremlin categorically denied the allegations. Upon his return to Russia in January 2021, Navalny was arrested on arrival for failing to show up to his 2014 court-mandated scheduled inspections while being treated in Germany. This sparked nationwide demonstrations with reports of police detaining up to 3,000 protesters across 40 cities. It also culminated in EU and US sanctions. On February 2nd, Russian courts sentenced Navalny to over two and a half years of prison time for violating probation, which Navalny’s lawyer then appealed. The appeal was partially rejected two weeks later, but the sentence was reduced by a month and a half.
On March 31st, Navalny announced that he was going on a hunger strike as a result of the authorities’ refusal to provide him with proper medical care for his spinal hernias. Most recently, Navalny was declared prone to heart attacks and kidney failure resulting from his 3-week strike and subsequently transferred to a hospital for vitamin treatment.
Support for the Kremlin’s harshest critic has poured in since his poisoning. Although the authoritarian nature of Putin’s rule is undeniable, some scrutiny of Russia’s vigorous opposition leader is only in order.
Many observers have hailed Navalny’s rise within Russia’s authoritarian political climate as a possible contender to Putin, with hopes for the introduction of anti-corruption measures, economic upswing, and Western rapprochement. Those who held these beliefs may be sorely disappointed as Navalny might be a figure symbolizing Russian democratization, but he is far from being a competent governor in and for himself.
The economic vision Navalny put forth during his presidential campaigns shows little expertise. It is as broad and populist as that of Putin’s throughout his rise to power. For instance, his minimum wage suggestion of RUB25,000 contains no explanation or analysis of its feasibility, beyond slogans such as “creating a well-function system” and how “most Russians are practically trying to survive”. Over the course of how long will this increase happen? And why 25,000? He has called for doubling healthcare and educational state spending, by cutting “unnecessary expenses”, but what are they?
He also suggested a tax levy on oligarchs, which he did not elaborate on further. When pressed for answers, Navalny stated it would amount to “somewhere between 40 and 80 per cent”, and that “experts” would have to further investigate the matter. Lev Schlosberg, a member of Russia’s oldest liberal party, has drawn similarities between Putin and Navalny’s lack of proper policy programs, stating, “but he [Putin] didn’t explain his policies in any of his election campaigns”.
Although many analysts expect a shift in Russian foreign policy following Putin’s departure from power, Navalny’s foreign policy does not hold much hope for Western rapprochement. Many of his stances stand at odds with the West. He has been vocal about his support for Russia’s involvement in Georgia’s 2008 war, even advocating for more direct involvement. He has also backed Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s secessionist efforts within Georgia. On the 12th anniversary of the Russian- Georgian war, the US embassy released a statement explicitly calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces, emphasizing Russia’s violations of its 2008 ceasefire agreement, which further exacerbates US-Russian tensions.
Navalny’s expansionist tendencies were also put on display in discussions of the Crimea conundrum; he has continuously backed Russia’s seizing of Crimea and has stated that he would not hand it over if he was to be elected President. He has also referred to Russian and Ukrainians as “one people”, a notion that has been thoroughly rejected by Ukrainians. On the founding of a Russian-free Orthodox church in Ukraine in 2018, Navalny tweeted, “What took centuries to create has been destroyed by Putin and his idiots in four years”. Expansionist Russian policies in Crimea have resulted in the befalling of worldwide sanctions for its breach of Ukrainian sovereignty. Then-President Obama imposed sanctions on occupied Crimea via executive orders, along with the EU who banned investments in the region. Both the EU and Canada then increased sanctions by targeting particular Russian individuals and companies. As of December 2020, the EU extended sanctions against Russian and occupied Crimea for another six months.
As such, the consequences of Navalny’s alignment with the current regime’s foreign policy is two-fold. First, a western rapprochement and easing of tensions is unlikely, contrary to the hopes of Western analysts. Second, sanctions are equally unlikely to be lifted.
Some have been disenfranchised by his racist nationalistic stances. During the Georgian war, Navalny called on Russia to expel all Georgians, calling them an ethnically racial slur he then apologized for. Another controversial stance of his is his friendship with far-right politicians and fringe nationalists such as Igor Girkin, who he had stated would be endorsed in elections despite suspicions of involvement in committing war crimes in Eastern Ukraine. Paul Goble, a US expert on Russian ethnic relations reported, “If someone who is as high-profile as Aleksei Navalny has become uses ugly words to describe ethnic minorities and appears to appeal directly to some of the most fundamentalist values of ethnic Russians, then there is a real danger that extremist elements -- which I'm quite sure Navalny himself would condemn -- will see that as a sanction for their behavior”.
Finally, not unlike Putin, Navalny runs a one-man show. Although his name has made headlines, many would fail to name his political party for instance. Media coverage of his poisoning and imprisonment has been centered around his charismatic personality and his popularity among Russians, which effectively rests on his populist anti-corruption rhetoric, void of policy programs. Many would argue that Navalny enjoys cult-like status among his supporters, and it is one of the least desirable aspects of his possible national leadership. The extent to which Navalny’s solo performance will be checked once in power, in view of both Putin’s legacy of complete paralysis of state institutions and Navalny’s popularity, remains questionable.
In light of his incompetence, Navalny would be effectively swapping places with Putin. Since his rise to the Russian public sphere, Navalny’s trademark has been opposition to Putin’s corruption within his party and the resultant dismantling of state institutions. Many warn that once in power, opposition figures tend to slip into the same corrupt practices – sometimes worse – than that of their predecessors. The problem is then compounded by Navalny’s lack of economic expertise and his expansionist and nationalistic undertones.
Slipping from an opposition figure to a despot is likelier than it sounds. History has witnessed a number of prominent figures who, driven by change and supported by wide segments of their respective societies, have themselves been turned corrupted once in government. 20th century revolutionary movements provide sound case studies: Fidel Castro in Cuba and Sandinistas in Nicaragua are two famous examples of good guys turned bad. In more recent times, there is still something to be learned from similar experiences of other countries.
Take neighboring Ukraine, for instance.
Victor Yushchenko is a banker turned opposition leader who served as the President of Ukraine between 2005 and 2010. Civil society rejoiced upon his election, ridding them of outgoing President Leonid Kuchma – notoriously known for his corrupt practices. So much so that upon the country’s election agency’s handing over of the victory to Kuchma’s pick, protests erupted across Kiev by nightfall, raising a momentum of over 200,000 protesters – which came to be known as Ukraine’s Orange revolution, in reference to Yushchenko’s campaign color – lasting until Yushchenko’s eventual inauguration. They were soon disappointed. His government was continuously marked by paralysis, chronic delays, and a lack of vision.
Throughout his term, local officials hit the marks by distributing communal land in cities like L’viv and Kiev. A number of close Yushchenko partners have been accused of corruption, such as the President’s faction leader in Parliament - Mykola Martynenko – on allegations on money laundering later proven true, and his secretary of national security - Petro Poroshenko. The President himself failed to escape these allegations. A non-profit organization in his wife’s name – allegedly founded to build a children’s hospital - gathered an amount of over $15 million throughout his tenure as President, all from rich citizens and business, leaked documents show. The hospital was never built. Oleh Ryabchuk, Yushchenko’s former chief of state, said “Yushchenko thought that it was enough to break Kuchma’s regime and Ukraine would flourish. He didn’t see it was his responsibility to envision what he wanted Ukraine to be and imagine what he has to do and who he has to do it with to achieve these changes”.
What can Russia learn? Putin’s retirement from politics won’t in and of itself trigger the process of democratization. Likewise, Navalny’s ascension to the presidency won’t necessarily entail Russian reform. Still, nuances must be accounted for. Many experts and activists alike regard Navalny as a means to an end, but not an end in himself. For instance, Duma deputy Igor Yakovenko supported Navalny as “a demolisher of the Putin regime, of the current rule”. However, he added, “But I can’t support him as a presidential candidate”. Likewise, journalist Matvei Ganapolsky holds a practical attitude towards the opposition leader, stating “ For me, he is a tool -- Navalny. His opinions about the authorities in Moscow, about the anti-Kremlin mood, completely correspond to my own. I don't have any other candidate”. This attitude towards the Kremlin is also echoed amongst Russian youth. A new poll published by the Levada Center shows a 15-point increase in dissatisfaction with Putin among Russians aged between 18 and 24, accounting for 46%. Navalny might not be a viable alternative in terms of policy, but he could still be helpful in offering Russia a window of democratization. Whether his attempt at seizing the presidency will succeed in light of his recent imprisonment is yet to be seen. In any case, the issue of hegemony and circumvention of state institutions in Russia cannot realistically be solved over the course of a single presidency, so Navalny supporters ought not to hold their breath. What he can potentially offer is a break from Putin’s one-party rule, on the condition of existing checks on himself and his party as well, as to not commit his arch-nemesis’ same mistake.