Troubled Waters between Beijing and Washington - The Suez Blunder, a Humorous Moment in an otherwise Tense Cold War Environment
Analysis by Johnny Achkar, Contributor
April 1st, 2021
It is strangely comforting to be faced with a global danger that feels very much like a comedic routine after a turbulent year of pandemic, economic recession, and foreign tensions. On 23 March 2021, Ever Given, a container ship of the Golden class, ran aground in Egypt's Suez Canal, blocking a road through which 12 percent of the world's trade flows. As vessels clustered at either end of the main waterway, tugboats scrambled to free the 400-meter-long ship, in an unsuccessful effort thus far. The large container ship that is blocking the Suez Canal is pushing shipping firms to choose the painful choice of detouring through Africa's southern tip, a journey that ships used to take in 1800s! An alternative and shorter route would be through the Arctic sea routes. However, in the seas north of Siberia, global warming and melting ice have made access easier, but regulatory and geopolitical obstacles remain. The issue of economic feasibility also arises, as the waters are too shallow for giant Ever Given-sized container ships to navigate on.
The sluggish crisis has proven to be an excellent opportunity for users online to display their meme-making skills with themes ranging from procrastination, $1,400 stimulus checks in reaction to the Coronavirus pandemic, to handling Covid depression by going on a daily walk. However, it would be a mistake to downplay the gravity of the situation. Chokepoints for global shipping have become a source of economic weakness that has fueled centuries of great power rivalry. It is now one of the key drivers of rising tensions between Washington and Beijing, driving everything from China's Belt and Road Initiative, to support for Myanmar's military coup, to the formation of a naval flotilla off the Philippine coast and provocative noises over Taiwan.
For centuries, the transport of commodities by sea has inspired both world strife and trading, and the chokepoints in the network have been the source of both. The 5th century BC Greco-Persian wars were waged, at least in part, for control of the Black Sea grain trading routes that held Greece's city-states intact. Tomé Pires, a Portuguese explorer, discovered a cosmopolitan city on the west coast of Malaysia in 1512, where 84 languages were spoken and merchants came from as far as Abyssinia, Armenia, China, and the Molucca islands near New Guinea. He wrote, "Whoever is Lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice."
Regulation of the straits through which the world's shipping travels is perhaps more important now than it has ever been, considering the fact that aviation and telecommunications have changed global trade over the last century. Sea shipping accounts for about two-thirds of global crude oil exchange and 80% of refined products. According to data from the US Energy Information Administration and S&P Global Intelligence, almost 10% of total seaborne oil and 20% of container volume passes by Suez alone. According to statistics, the Suez Canal remains one of the most important trade routes, especially for Asia and Europe. In 2019, over 19,000 ships traversed the passage, carrying over 1.25 billion tons of freight. Every week, the Canal transports hundreds of thousands of containers containing equipment, electronics, other intermediary products, and raw materials from Asia to Europe and back. The growth in tonnage across the Suez is largely due to the growing scale of ships. The Ever Given, one of the largest container ships capable of transporting 20,000 20-foot containers at a time, is so massive that it barely fits through the Malacca Straits.
The blockage or control of maritime sea routes is a distinctive weakness for China. In comparison to the United States, which presently is a net exporter of crude, China imports close to three quarters of the oil it produces, and about four fifths of the iron ore it requires for its frenetic build-up in the economy. Moreover, Beijing relies on much of these goods in order to obtain hard currency in order to pay for these products. As a result, China is especially vulnerable to maritime blockades.
Due to the geography of East Asia, the straits of Malacca and Singapore, as well as the quasi-straits that extend across navigable parts of the South China Sea and those dividing Taiwan from the Philippines, Japan's Okinawa islands, and the Chinese mainland, are all extremely vulnerable to interdictions in the event of war. Most of China's foreign policy during the last decade has made more sense as a method of fixing such vulnerabilities. Chinese firms own about 65 percent of the world's busiest ports. All of the key elements of President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Plan, including an infrastructure conduit across Pakistan, gas pipelines across Myanmar, and an intermodal rail path through the Malay Peninsula, serve to decrease China's reliance on the Malacca and Singapore straits. The South China Sea covers about 3.5 million square kilometers of water. The Sea is surrounded by China and the Southeast Asian littoral states of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia. This semi-enclosed maritime space, which extends from the Malacca Strait in the south-west to the Taiwan Strait in the northeast, is crucial for strategic purposes.
Per year, over 40,000 ships travel through the South China Channel, accounting for about 40% of global sea trade. The People's Republic of China formally declares indisputable jurisdiction over the South China Sea's four main archipelagic communities. Historical grievances emanating from the post-1945 Pacific order motivate claims of hegemony over maritime features and jurisdictions, as well as President Xi’s vision of a ‘Chinese dream’, that seeks to reclaim China’s glittering past as a great power.
Source: Deutsche Welle // retrieved from:https://www.dw.com/en/south-china-sea-what-you-need-to-know/a-40054470
On April 2, 2020, a Vietnamese fishing vessel sunk in disputed South China Sea waters after being rammed by the Chinese coastguard. In March 2019, a related incident occurred near the Chinese-controlled Paracel Islands. The incident was described by the US as "the latest in a long string of PRC actions in the South China Sea to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors". Beijing heightened tensions in the area on April 18, 2020 when it announced the establishment of two separate administrative districts, one for the Paracel Islands and the other for the Spratly Islands. Beijing has also sought to fortify its sphere of influence over the area by building military bases on these islands. For instance, in April 2018, the then-incoming Chief of the Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, testified before Congress that “once occupied [by PLA forces], China would be able to expand its reach thousands of miles to the south and project control deep into Oceania,” posing a danger to historically secure US sea-lines of communication. Beijing has fortified several forward operating bases with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), as well as underground storage areas, hangars, radars, and sensor arrays for the time being. Beijing conducted anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) tests near the contested Spratly islands in late June 2019 to demonstrate the Chinese military's growing counter-intervention capability to deter the US and its allies. China has large air, navy, coast guard, and coastal militia powers to put to bear if armed war occurs in the South China Sea.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy is the largest fleet in the Indo-Pacific, according to the US Department of Defense, with at least 300 ships, as well as warships, amphibious ships, naval boats, and advanced ships. In recent years, China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, has been the subject of extreme media attention. In April 2018, the Liaoning took part in live-fire drills in the South China Sea with at least 40 other surface ships. Beijing has recently increased the size of its PLAN Marine Corps from 10,000 to 30,000 personnel, which would undoubtedly help it project amphibious forces into the SCS. According to one report from a US think tank, 45 significant SCS accidents occurred between 2010 and 2016, with 71 percent of them involving at least one Chinese Coast Guard or maritime law enforcement vessel. The vow made by President Xi Jinping to the United States in 2015 not to militarize the Spratly archipelago was a farce. Furthermore, fears that China will attack Taiwan militarily in the near future have risen. This should not surprise many observers, as President Xi has already stated his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control either by diplomatic negotiations or by force. China sees Taiwan as a renegade province. This is because when Chairman Mao emerged victorious in the Chinese Civil War, his opponents fled to the island. In the year 2020, Chinese warplanes flew close to Taiwan almost every day. Up to 37 PLA aircraft flew through the Taiwan Strait at once, shattering a historically unbroken taboo that both sides usually valued.
The US should preserve its cool and non-aggressive stance as it has done with China through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) dialogue. However, the United States has two other options for ensuring the protection of certain vital rivers. To begin, the United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which describes Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as international waters in which warships can travel safely. Although the United States has long followed its own laws, ratifying UNCLOS would grant American opposition to assertions to jurisdiction over territorial waters the weight of international law. Second, the United States should followthe Rule of Gross Tonnage and perform frequent freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea to preserve its transparency. Washington should also continue to regard the South China Seas as foreign waters to avoid developing a culture of deference to Chinese claims. This is not a belligerent or offensive stance; rather, it is a reinforcement of long-standing American and diplomatic practices against foreign waters.
In light of the aforementioned analysis, certain big conclusions can be drawn for the future. China's militarization of the area is unparalleled as opposed to SCS counter claimants. If the situation is left unresolved, tensions could reach a boiling point in the region, yet with no clear military competitor in the area, Beijing would reign supreme. The United States must exercises all of its options before being forced to a likely costly and expensive struggle over these strategic sea routes.