Who Will be Tehran’s Lifeline? A Tug of War Between Beijing & Washington
Opinion Policy Analysis by Reem El Dana, Staff Writer
November 17th, 2020
The Iranian regime’s ideological dogma is neither emphatic on turning East nor West, yet the Islamic Republic is obliged to be pragmatic to guarantee its regime survival and preclude an all economic collapse in the vestige of President Rouhani’s tenure. As a revisionist state seeking to upend the existing regional, political and security order in the Middle East, Iran has been in talks with China since 2016. This talk culminated in a $400 billion-dollar deal, dubbed Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, to reap an economic, military and intelligence focused 25-year accord. Consequently, this partnership was largely unwelcomed by and undeniably intimidating to Washington and its allies in the Middle East.
Will Washington allow the deal to crystallize? Is China promising more than it could realistically deliver in light of a global economic slowdown and recession? Is this deal merely a masquerade orchestrated by the two protagonists so China can gain concessions from Washington à propos its trade war, and Iran à propos its nuclear deal?
My take is the following; with a potential Biden administration, Rouhani will exercise cautious pragmatism vis a vis Washington’s fallible promises and will eagerly renegotiate a nuclear deal before the end of his term to at least secure the lifting of some sanctions and to give the economy a respite. The Sino-Iranian deal might be impaired by the Iranian hardliners occupying the majlis in tandem with Washington and its regional allies as the covenant will shift the balance of power to the benefit of the anti-American hegemony front.
Given that the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is a multilateral deal that allows the revitalization of Iran’s economic veins and the rightful integration of Iran in the international community, Iran would prefer it over the bilateral deal with China, especially since the latter pact contends with the Islamic Republic’s principles and will receive internal and external opprobrium if not sabotage.
The Middle East, being a geopolitically critical region, is one that galvanizes state and non-state armed actors to rile up conflicts for ideological and hegemonic dominations, along with profit from power vacuums to exert their influence and wield political opportunism. Since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, one of the uncompromising cornerstones of its foreign policy is the impermissibility of foreign powers to permeate its social cohesion, culture, economy, and according to Article 146 of its Constitution, the prohibition of any kind of foreign military base establishment.
Iran is axiomatically keen on safeguarding its national interests and by all means its regime survival by barring foreign political and economic dominance and exploitation, as Iranian history bore the brunt of British, Russian and American imperialism.
Albeit Iran’s strictures and austere consecration of its independence and territorial sovereignty against any form of oppression, it is nevertheless in the process of concluding an exaggerated $400 billion dollar deal with China that encompasses primarily economic, security, cybersecurity and intelligence trade in return for Iranian discounted oil.
China would gain a colossal influence in the region as the Middle East’s quickly changing landscape leaves ample space for Sino-Russian-Iranian strategies to capitalize as a result of the American retrenchment policy. However, this agreement could be hurdled by the newly normalized relations between israel and the Gulf states that epitomize the new face lift against Iranian hegemony on one hand, and the economic decline as a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak on the other. Nonetheless, a dollar-free zone using e-RMB to bypass American sanctions would be crucial to the success of the agreement.
The Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has been approved by Rouhani’s administration in June, however the majlis hasn’t ratified it and its content hasn’t been publicly released. The strategic partnership agreement is bound to receive much awaited condemnation for Tehran’s permission to allow Chinese troops on Iranian soil to uphold its interests and for implicitly selling Iran to China, however simmering tensions between the US, China and Iran are coming to the boil, and this deal might be just propitious. All things considered, enduring the US’ economic warfare is exorbitantly pricy for Tehran to uphold, and thus due to a scarcity of choices, out of necessity and despair, Tehran is yielding to China.
Iran is one among many of China’s bargaining chips, and Beijing is unlikely to jeopardize its strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and israel over a scanty deal. Despite Beijing and Washington being at loggerheads as a result of Trump’s incited trade war, President-elect Biden is unlikely to accelerate it.
There is a plethora of reasons why President Biden is preferred over Trump, the basis of which is concerted in his less impetuous behavior, his participation in the formation of the nuclear deal in 2015 as Obama’s vice president, and his willingness to redress enmities with Iran as Rouhani is already calling Biden to come back to the nuclear deal. Mixed reactions have emanated in Tehran as a result of the long-awaited American presidential election; the strategic patience waiting game is over and as a result of the projected Biden win, a constructive exchange and overture of diplomatic channels from the White House towards Tehran might change the course of the upcoming Iranian presidential elections in June 2021 to the reformists’ favor. On the other hand, Trump’s demise could boost Iranian hardliners and claim the defeat of his maximum pressure campaign. Since the majlis is a conservatist majority, the regime’s call buttressed by Khamenei’s reiteration not to negotiate with the US might prevail and thus lead Iran to further alienation from globalization and international cooperation.
A JCPOA 2.0 is unlikely to materialize before 2022; an interim agreement can uphold a freeze for freeze where Iran halts some aspects of its nuclear program in return for oil and other related sanction relief. Diplomatic channels will be concocted for Biden by the EU to speed up the process of re-entering the deal while Rouhani is still the incumbent president, since having an otherwise conservatist president will make negotiations challenging.
The conundrum lies in the ability of the US to constrain what the original nuclear deal did not address – Iran’s ballistic program and its regional expansionist activities which many states find “destabilizing”. My take on the latter is the following; Iran will never concede to any requests that considerably undermine its national interests, subvert its regime, or expunge its raison d’être.
Tehran will misleadingly look like it is acquiescing more to a renewed JCPOA if negotiations pick up before the end of Rouhani’s term, and more so with a reformist elected president in 2021. Tehran kept violating UNSC resolution 2231 since 2015 regarding the testing of ballistic missiles fit to carry nuclear heads and has no reason, according to its dogma, not to violate it again. Iran is also reticent with respect to its nuclear facilities and activities, and selective in disclosing information to the IAEA and granting it access. Therefore, it is in Iran’s interest to pick Washington as its lifeline. Renegotiating the nuclear deal with the P5+1 will allow Iran to keep the very same mechanism that allowed its economy to flourish, its regional activities to expand, and its ballistic program to evolve, in lieu of touting Iran’s oil reservoirs and territorial sovereignty to China.