Pragmatism not Normalisation: Order of the Day
Opinion Foreign Policy Analysis by Francesco Pitzalis, Staff Writer and Tala Majzoub, Contributor
October 8th, 2020
On the 1st of October, Lebanon and israel, “neighbouring” states that have been at war since the Arab-israeli conflict of 1948-49, agreed to hold negotiations to end the long-running maritime border dispute. The speaker of the Lebanese parliament, Nabih Berri said that a “framework” had been established for negotiations which will take place under the auspices of the United Nations in the UN headquarters in the Southern Lebanese town of Naqura. This announcement comes only two weeks after israel and two Gulf Arab States, the UAE and Bahrain, signed US-brokered agreements to normalize their relations.
However, this is not the first time that Lebanon has held indirect talks with israel in the last thirty years. This happened repeatedly after the July 2006 war through the United Nations Interim Force in South Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2018, the spokesman for the international forces, Andrea Tenente, stated that negotiations are taking place almost daily in light of the tension that followed the construction of a border wall, and Lebanon proposed contracts for oil and gas exploration, some of which are in the disputed areas between the two parties. The following policy analysis discusses the implications of the forthcoming border negotiations for the Lebanese resistance and the Palestinian cause.
Figure 1. Illustration of disputed maritime border between Lebanon and Israel (Source: Shutterstock)
On the Resistance
“The United States of America intends to put in every effort necessary with the two parties concerned (Lebanon and israel), to help establish a positive and constructive atmosphere between them, in order to manage and conclude the above-mentioned negotiations as soon as possible.”Berri’s speech indicates a significant change in Lebanese political protocol, as direct negotiations between israel and Lebanon entail meeting in the same room. Likewise, American mediation demonstrates the degree to which the pro-resistance elements of the Lebanese political class have somewhat acquiesced to Western influence. This notion was previously categorically rejected by Hezbollah and its supporters, who consider the U.S mediation a “negotiation with an enemy mediated by another enemy”. Throughout the press conference, Berri completely abandoned the “resistance vocabulary” customary of Lebanese political discourse. Rather than referring to israel as “العدو الاسراأيلي” or “فلسطين المحتلة”, Berri referred to israel, quite blatantly, as israel. Berri also refused to answer questions preluding the nature of future relations between Lebanon and israel. While the framework agreement can be seen as a concession by the Amal Movement in exchange for reducing U.S. sanctions, Berri insisted that the sanctions against the former Finance Minister Ali Hasan Khalil's did not soften his stance towards accepting US-mediated negotiations with israel. He also maintained that he would not end his political career by ceding to the israeli side. This narrative has thus far succeeded in convincing the Shiite sect of Amal Movement’s loyalty to Lebanon's sovereignty and resistance to the israeli entity, thereby maintaining Amal’s popular support.
The core question persists, do the negotiations mean the end of a pretext for the resistance? Hezbollah’s core support base is garnered from an unwavering and uncompromising state of direct confrontation with israel. Thus, the border negotiations are an ideological, ontological and epistemological tight rope for Hezbollah and will undoubtedly weaken their standing in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah’s armed resistance was effective in pre-empting the israeli enemy and prompting an end to the occupation (1982-2000). However, current use of the resistance to end the occupation is wholly unrealistic. Instead, the resistance is resorting to pragmatism in concentrating their efforts to benefit the Lebanese state.
Hezbollah’s willingness to negotiate must be contextualized within the continued Western isolation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iranian revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) were crucial in establishing the Islamic resistance in 1982 and the Islamic republic has since provided unrelenting ideological and financial support for their Lebanese allies. Indeed, Nasrallah famously quipped “as long as Iran has money, we have money.” Well, that money is quickly depleting; as conceded recently by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who lamented Iranian suffering from US sanctions. The United States nevertheless has expressed a willingness to facilitate, or rather steer, the establishment of a government in Lebanon and even pump in money to ease the economic crisis. Thus, therein lies the nature of Hezbollah’s recent pragmatism. The group realizes it has to ease its ideological belligerence to the United States in order to secure Western investment in Lebanon. Simultaneously, Hezbollah are banking on maintaining a front against the israeli enemy to maintain their popular base. The militant group realize they cannot have their cake and eat it. Maybe they will eat half the cake involving their resistance ideology and keep the other half for negotiations.
Figure 2. Posters of Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian Islamic revolutionary, Ruhollah Khomeini in Southern Lebanon. (Source: The Boston Globe)
Lebanon’s financial woes, in addition to the rapid formation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, has prompted a need for the Lebanese to accelerate their exploration efforts for oil and gas in the disputed region with israel. Undoubtedly, concession of natural gas to israel will promote American investment and diplomatic support towards the Lebanese state, which may, yet also may not, crucially bypass the pockets of Lebanese politicians. Seeing as the diplomatic negotiations would theoretically allow both parties to exploit offshore natural gas fields, it would be idealistic for Lebanon to completely reject the pragmatic approach with israel. Berri suggests that gas from near the disputed area could “help us pay our debt.” However, if we have learned one thing or another about “Lebanese politicians”, this resource is likely to get plundered and would consequently be of no direct economic benefit to the Lebanese people in terms of welfare necessarily. That considered, Lebanon must now decide how much of the disputed territory it is willing to concede. The driving force of these negotiations is political pragmatism. Officials are trying to extract the best possible outcomes in the midst of Lebanon’s crises. The question therein lies, Lebanon employs a non-compliant yet pragmatic policy towards israel; will the West through diplomatic, economic and political alienation continue to make Lebanon’s life a living “hell”? Would Lebanon’s pragmatic negotiations with israel abandon the Palestinian cause?
On Palestine and Lebanon
Border negotiations between Lebanon and israel are comprised within a wider israeli-Palestinian conflict and an overarching struggle for Palestinian justice. Lebanon has been a target of Zionist oppression since 1948. Zionist forces invaded and captured 13 villages in Southern Lebanon in October 1948 and proceeded to execute over 80 and 100 villagers in the villages of Hula and Saliha respectively. Conquest of Southern Lebanon has remained a key strategy of senior Zionists for a multitude of reasons. In 1919, the Zionists demanded of the British mandate a state extending past the Litani river (present day Lebanon), to provide an adequate water supply for a future Jewish state.
In 1955, Prime Minister Moshe Sharret recorded in his diary a desire to occupy Southern Lebanon and “create a Christian regime which will ally itself with Israel.” The plan was ratified by Zionist “founding father” David Ben Gurion and General Moshe Dayan and later enacted by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon in 1982. Sharon’s invasion engendered 18 years of Zionist occupation in Southern Lebanon and manifested itself following the bombardment of West Beirut and the massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the camps of Sabra and Shatila. The massacre was heinously perpetrated by israel’s phalangist allies under the flares of Sharon’s IDF. In essence, Zionist oppression directly and intimately targets the state of Lebanon itself. The invasion and occupation of Lebanon actualised a long-term Zionist vision to secure its Northern border, a water supply and a regional ally. Thus, it is a fallacy held amongst rigid supporters of Lebanese particularism that Lebanon is dislocated from the issue of Palestine and should unconditionally normalise relations with israel. Furthermore, poorly defined borders with the Zionist entity blurs imagined geographies between “us” and “them”, which has exacerbated border disputes and made Zionist incursion into Lebanon all too easy. The authors maintain that border negotiation is necessary for Lebanon as Zionism encompasses Lebanon itself.
In comparison, israeli peace deals with Arab states have been a strategic tool for the israelis to gain regional consent for their policies of dispossession. A failed two-state solution has “perpetuated a situation of no solution” and provided international acquiescence for further dispossession of Palestinian land. This was resolutely clear following israel’s attempt to annex large sections of the West Bank in July 2020. Annexation was postponed by israel for an alleged exchange for peace with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain - which the UAE and Bahrain later announced was entirely false and no such halts to annexation was a result of their involvement. Thus, israel is making a false “concession” of land it appropriated illegally (under virtually every source of public international law) and is being rewarded for it. The UAE and Bahrain have no experience of conflict with israel yet have irrespectively reaped the benefits of American petrodollars. The two countries prospered peacefully from Western investment yet offered a brazen seal of approval for continued Palestinian oppression.
Figure 3. Palestinian refugees on the road to Lebanon from Palestine on November 4, 1948 (Source: Al Jazeera)
Thus, if normalisation is Palestinian betrayal, what strategy should be employed by the Lebanese whilst negotiating with israel? To dissociate from Palestine is to let the issue fester and prolong the conflict; to both Palestine and Lebanon’s detriment. Yet, armed conflict against israel exacerbates the Zionist state’s reliance on armed non-state actors to dehumanise Arabs and maintain their siege with Western backing. Pragmatism is the order of the day. Chomsky asserts, “When different forms of oppression emanate from the same source, the struggle against it has to be focused.” Therefore, it is our estimation that Lebanon should strike a balance between direct confrontation and complete capitulation (normalisation). This means engaging with israel for focused negotiations whilst maintain diplomatic, political and moral support with the Palestinian cause.
Border negotiations with israel is exactly what is required. Those who advocate for armed conflict fail to acknowledge that you cannot throw the Jewish settlers into the sea. As recognised by numerous Antizionist Arab scholars such as Azmi Bechara, the Jews do have a right to a presence in historical Palestine. This should be seen an attempt to redefine Lebanese sovereignty and thus the rules of the game. Correspondingly, negotiation does not necessitate normalisation and does not green-light the occupation and abandon the Palestinian cause. To negotiate one’s borders at the table is to fight for one’s rights through a different medium.
To move towards a just settlement for Palestinians and the Lebanese, you have to sit at the table but you do not have to drink the tea.