The Bisri Dam Project: a black mark on the Lebanese government’s record?

Analysis by Zeina Dagher, Staff Writer

April 14th, 2020

While the vast majority of Lebanese people struggle to survive in the midst of an economic crisis and a global pandemic, where food prices have considerably increased and incomes decreased, the Lebanese Cabinet decided on the 2nd of April to move forward with the Bisri dam project, a relatively highly costly project for a bankrupt state. Ever since the World Bank approved its funding in 2015, it has been a highly controversial project for a number of reasons that we will tackle shortly, but even more so in the current socio-economic and sanitary situation. In short, the decision of the Cabinet is not only a slap in the face of millions of Lebanese becoming poorer and poorer each day, but also in the face of science, of Lebanon’s economy, of its natural heritage and rich culture - that we never fail to boast, and of the multiple alternatives that Lebanon has to supply its people with more-than-enough water. After all, Lebanon is known for being rich in water resources, unlike most of the surrounding countries. 

First, some facts about the project: the Bisri dam is part of a bigger project, the Lebanon Water Supply Augmentation project, organized by the government to supply the Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon regions with water, as a solution to water shortages. It is funded by the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the government, and is executed by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). According to the World Bank, the total project cost would be of $617 million, with a loan of $474 million from the World Bank itself, $128 million from the Islamic Development Bank, and $15 million from the government. While it was still time to put the project to a full stop, the dam construction having not yet begun, and knowing that the Lebanese state is going through a dollar shortage and will certainly not be able to repay the loans (let alone allow citizens to withdraw their dollars), the Cabinet’s decision to continue with the Bisri dam project once again seems like another of the rich minority’s whims being thrown on middle and low class citizens. 

But that leads us to another question: why is the government so adamant on building the Bisri dam, when it’s no secret that most of the other dam projects in Lebanon have failed? Let’s take a look at the Balaa dam, that was an obvious failure on a vast variety of levels according to the Legal Agenda. The dam should have costed between $18 million and $25 million, at most. However, it ended up costing a whopping $70 million, for a dam that collects 800,000 cubic meters of water. So why is that? The answer is that the government never really tried to study the land they are building the dam on, and only found out at the start of the excavations that the site was filled with 25 sinkholes, some even bottomless. Instead of stopping the project, they decided to fill up the sinkholes, first with concrete (that disappeared into it), then with rocks, all adding to the initial cost millions of dollars, and all taken from public funds. Not to mention that the rocks used to fill up the sinkholes were to be extracted from nearby areas flourishing with junipers - classified as natural reserves under the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory - if local environmental activists had not intervened.

The Lebanese government is not the only one determined on building the Bisri dam. In fact, the World Bank has shown an unusual insistence on the project, dedicating multiple documents, videos, even a list of FAQ’s on its website to thwart any criticism on the project. They even featured testimonials  by renowned experts in the field, asserting that it is safe and beneficial. The truth is that, according to The Public Source, infrastructure has always paved the way for neoliberal development, the World Bank’s ultimate goal. These international institutions measure economic growth through GDP increases, and argue that infrastructure projects will serve that purpose by, for example, creating job opportunities. However, what they do ignore is “to whom will resources be distributed and from whom will they be withdrawn.” The Bisri dam is in fact part of a configuration that guarantees further accumulation for the rich, “through land expropriation, construction contracts awarded to engineering firms like Dar al-Handasah, the privatization of resources and services, norms of public theft in the form of hidden commissions, and interest payments to various lenders including the World Bank.” In a country like Lebanon, ruled by corrupt politicians, the outcome is already clear: the debt of the government will be paid off by middle and lower classes, while the rich and those close to the people in power monopolize the benefits produced. This conclusion is only based on experience: the electricity sector in Lebanon is a prime example of what to expect from the Bisri dam. 

What’s even more chocking is that this dam is absolutely useless: Lebanon already has enough water to supply Beirut and Mount Lebanon. In fact, according to  studies from the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) and the CDR itself, the Ministry of Water and Energy has not kept track of water from precipitation, springs, groundwater basins, and wells since the late 1960s, even leaving unauthorized springs to be controlled by mafias who sell their water to citizens. That being said, a country that has 40 rivers and an annual river flow is estimated at around 3,900 million cubic meters, aquifers with a recharge rate of 500 million cubic meters per year, and over 2000 seasonal springs generating a total of 1,150-1,200 million cubic meters per year of water – among other water resources –  should not have a water problem. The real problem is the lack of maintenance in our current water system, and a gross mismanagement of our water resources by the Lebanese state: for example, aquifers are overexploited, while springs are not fully benefitted from. “Around 70% of Beirut’s water is provided from the Jeita Spring, but 40% of that water goes to waste before even reaching the capital because of poor maintenance and a rotten waterpipe network that suffers from uncontrolled leakage.” Therefore, building (non-functional) dams that cost hundreds of millions of dollars, instead of addressing the real issue, seems like the most absurd of decisions a government could make: the Bisri dam is not being built to solve the water shortages, but to please international institutions, serve their geopolitical plans, and benefit corrupt local mafias. 

The dam is not only useless, it’s also dangerous. In a report done by Dar al-Handasah in August 2014, the high seismicity of the Bisri valley was listed among the disadvantages of the project. In fact, le Roum fault, a “highly active fault and the source of earthquakes”, passes right under the valley. It was probably responsible for the 1956 earthquake of magnitude 6, which killed 136 people and destroyed 6000 homes. Therefore, there are fears that earthquake could be triggered from pressure exerted by water reservoirs on earthquake faults, known as Reservoir Triggered Seismicity (RTS), which the CDR obviously denied. “We call on the Lebanese public opinion, on our parliamentarians, and on all political parties and political and spiritual leaders. We request that they be informed that the Bisri Dam project is a ticking atomic bomb,” said Dr. Tony Nemer, assistant professor of Geology at the American University of Beirut, at a press conference on June 27th of last year. 

It's also hard to overlook the environmental drawbacks of such a project. The Bisri valley is considered a protected regional environmental park by the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory, and a natural site to be protected by the Ministry of Environment. It houses many species of migratory birds, some of them even near-threatened. With the dam’s construction, an estimated 150,000 woodland trees will be cut, and the number might even reach 500,000 according to environmental activists, labeling it an “environmental genocide”. The dam also requires the expropriation of productive agricultural land in the valley, which makes up 57% of the total land expropriated, and has an estimated annual revenue of $125 million. Knowing that Lebanon has a very weak agricultural sector, the government should be doing everything in its power to strengthen the little agricultural activity the country has. 

The valley also has an exceptional historical heritage, with over 50 archaeological sites dating back to the Bronze Age, Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Mameluke and Ottoman periods. The historical ruins include a Roman temple, bridges, tombs, a historical church, a convent, traditional houses and others. Needless to say, the construction of the dam is a threat to these sites, that could even draw tourist activity if publicized enough. 

In the end, the only hope for the Bisri valley is national popular pressure. As of April 9, 2020, municipalities in Mazraat el-Chouf, Bsaba, Amatour and Bater decided to withdraw their approval on the Bisri dam project. This victory might be little, but it shows that the continuous pressure from activists is starting to bear its fruits: it is not too late to save the Bisri valley.