The Dilemmas of Voter Apathy & Social Mobilization in Lebanon

Opinion Policy Analysis by Gaia Bchara, Contributor and Omar Badr, Contributor

February 24th, 2021

In 2018, Lebanon held its first Parliamentary Elections in nine years. For the first time since 2009, Lebanese citizens had the chance to select new representatives. With such a long wait between the two elections, the country had many first-time voters ready to cast their vote. With the momentum of the upcoming “Democratic Wedding”, as labelled by mainstream media, there seemed to be a lot of excitement leading up to elections. A high turnout could safely be expected. However, results were much more different than expected, instead of a rise in voter turnout, a 5% drop was seen, with around 49% of the Lebanese population choosing to vote on May 6, 2018.

Additionally, election results yielded a very similar parliament to the one prior, with a slight shift in seats between the de facto ruling parties. For the first time, a national coalition ran in the face of the traditional sectarian parties. A coalition of civil society groups and opposition parties ran together in most of the country’s electoral regions; however their results were poor. The coalition gained 4% of the overall vote and were only able to win 1 seat out of the 128 contested seats. With half of the country’s eligible population choosing not to vote and an overwhelming majority of voters, 96%, voting for the same parties, the situation leads us to a few glaring questions. Why was there so much voter apathy? Why did voters elect the same groups? And is there a way to combat voter apathy and mobilize the population effectively?

Let’s start with the people who decided to vote and try to understand the general trends in voter behavior. According to a detailed study conducted by the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS), titled “Understanding Turnout in the 2018 Elections”, we can find overall themes that explain why people voted how they voted in 2018. A glaring, and almost obvious, theme was that people overwhelmingly tended to vote for sectarian counterparts. Meaning, people chose to vote for candidates who shared the same sect as themselves. With 77% of voters registered in voting booths housing voters of a single sect, the data shows that the vast majority of voters voted for candidates of the same sect. Furthermore, citizens that did not have a seat representing their sect in their respective electoral region tended not to vote at all. This result is seen in the dramatically lower voter turnout rate found amongst minority religious groups, with groups such as Alawites, Christian minorities and Armenian Orthodox and Catholic groups, yielding a turnout rate of less than 33%; with Christian Minorities yielding a record low turnout rate of 24%. 

This phenomenon helps us paint a clear picture of the Lebanese psyche on election day, and reinforces a very eloquent conclusion made by Dr Bashar Haydar, AUB Professor of Philosophy in his piece in the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, that there is a “mutual unwillingness” for different Lebanese communities (religious groups) to “make sacrifices”, and not vote for their sectarian leaders, “in order to effect change.” Therefore, the decision on election day is not made based on selecting the best candidate, rather it is made to maintain the fragile status quo.

A second theme that helps us explain why voters voted, and connects to our above point, is the maintaining of strong clientelist ties through vote buying. According to LCPS, 20% of voters that were surveyed, self-reported vote buying; meaning that they admitted to their vote being bought by a sectarian party. Using the collected data, a more accurate estimate is that at the bare minimum 40% of voters were subject to vote buying. And so almost half the population was subject to voter buying, a truly appalling, though not very surprising, statistic. Seeing that less developed areas had much higher levels of voter turnout, these areas were targeted by vote buying, given that they tend to be cheaper to buy and are more vulnerable to intimidation by politicians. Regions with higher levels of unemployment ,  housing more vulnerable groups prone to vote buying, also voted more than other regions. This represents one of the many tools of the political elite to enforce a cycle of dependency - financial and otherwise - among their constituents and subsequently maintain the status quo. 

With non-programmatic political parties dominating the scene, high levels of vote buying that sway votes in a predetermined manner towards sectarian counterparts and high levels of mobilization that left countless voting stations under the intense monitoring of sectarian parties. We can understand, on a macro level, just why people chose to vote in 2018. 

What about the remaining 51% who haven’t voted? Abstention can be explained, among other things, by the “Voting Paradox”. Also known as Down’s paradox, the Voting Paradox claims that a rational, self-interestedindividual will refrain from voting because the costs of doing so trump its benefits. In other words, the effort one would have to exert to inform themselves about the mechanisms of voting, each candidates’ policy program, competence, and past record, followed by the willingness to show up on election day, wait in line to vote and potentially get exposed to some sort of voter intimidation, knowing that the probability of their single vote affecting the election’s results are very slim, isn’t worth it. In the absence of a viable alternative to traditional political parties, many felt their vote inconsequential. In return, this choice strips away their right to participate in national decision-making processes. 

However, since 2018, Lebanon has witnessed a number of changes. First, the 17th of October uprising demonstrated the large desire of a substantial portion of the population for a political alternative, many of which have mobilized and established new political parties to spread political literacy and coordinate direct action. Although such demands have been echoed in the past few years, none were of this scale and impact. Consequently, it provides decent ground for a group-based model of voting. This type of decision-making disseminates the responsibilities (costs) that typically fall on the one individual to the group level. More importantly, making decisions as a group fundamentally changes the probability of impacting electoral results, therefore incentivizing formerly de-mobilized people to vote. 

Second, the benefits most definitely exceed the costs of voting this election. Lebanon is facing an unprecedented economic, financial, social, and political crisis that requires skilled governance to manage it. Lebanon suffers from a 40% unemployment rate, 23% of the population plunged in extreme poverty, an almost 9,000 LBP/USD exchange rate, 145.8% inflation rate, Lebanese Lira losing 80% of its value against the dollar in less than a year, and endless stalling in the formation of the very government that is needed to tackle these issues. The numbers are discouraging and have most definitely impacted almost all – if not all – Lebanese households. It is precisely in times of crisis that the rewards of having competent legislators capable of navigating hardships surpass typical electoral considerations. This elections’ consequences will be reflected in the monetary, economic, and financial reform strategies, basic infrastructure and restructuring in sectors like electricity, job opportunities, social and environmental justice, and an independent judiciary – or lack thereof. This makes for reasonable ground to believe that the next election has the potential to produce a higher voter turnout and additional alternative voices in parliament.  

The question is how? On the individual level, what are efficient ways to reach out to our family, friends, and small/large community and incite them to vote? Years of research conducted on effective voter mobilization strategies have almost unanimously reached one conclusion: people respond to people. Canvassing to mobilize citizens to vote has been proven to be 150% more likely to increase turnout than a phone call, phone calls arethree times more effective when they are conversational than scripted, and even scripted commercial callers are 7 times more effective than mail. Do you see the pattern? The more personal and genuine, the more effective. Mobilizing a discouraged voter will take an honest, back-and-forth conversation about the impact and significance of voting. Most importantly, the best suited person to have these conversations with a de-mobilized citizen is an acquaintance. In other words, the best person to convince your dad, friend, or partner to vote is YOU. In fact, studies conducted prove that being encouraged to vote by someone you know is much more effective than being encouraged by a stranger or campaigner. What is more, another study revealed that having one member vote increases turnout among all people within the same household. And the best news is, sometimes, all you have to do is ask! Promises are often more than just cheap talk. Pledging to vote has been actually proven to make it more likely that people follow through. 

This brings us to the issue of norms of participation in a group setting. Within groups, enhancing social observability is crucial to increase voter turnout. What does this mean? People learn about the best option they have by observing others. This can lead to a heap of individuals making the same decision, which is to say: being vocal about your intention to vote can lead others to do the same within your circles, because behavior spreads in networks. Finally, when someone is really insistent on not voting, refer to the foot-in-the-door strategy: don’t ask them to vote, ask them to do another, smaller, less costly task related to elections. For instance, checking if their name is on the electoral lists (and if you haven’t yet, go do that now). From there, build on small “assignments” before asking them to vote. The rationale behind this strategy is that when people invest time and effort in any act, they infer new traits, attributes, and values about themselves based on their initial act. Hence, they become motivated to act on this newfound identity and follow through with their actions.

So why all this hassle? Simply because voters dictate policy. Current political parties’ mobilization efforts target – sometimes exclusively - their voter base, partly because the silent majority exhibits no signs of willingness to participate in the electoral process. Interestingly, we have seen a shift in rhetoric throughout attempts to form a cabinet, consistent with the demands of a large segment of the voting population, to appoint technocrats and independents. Similarly, also consistent with October 17th Revolution’s demands, many political parties have – and others probably will – started campaigning on a platform calling for a “civil state”, an agenda that inherently contradicts their very mechanism of operation in government. That is partly because they anticipate these segments to vote. When large groups vote according to a policy program, politicians are compelled to produce one. Similarly, when large groups vote based on sectarian affiliation, politicians have incentive to capitalize on sectarian identities. If you have certain demands you would like to see met, one of the best ways to force policy makers' hands to cater to you is to vote.

Breaking the vicious cycle will neither be easy nor prompt. But it is not impossible. Currently, two major routes can be taken. First, the large Lebanese diaspora can potentially be a game changer. In 2018, over 80,000 expats registered to vote, of which approximately 46,000 did. Diaspora voting presents logistical advantages, whereby voters living in a certain area/state can ALL head to the same voting station, unlike in Lebanon where each is required to vote in his registered district. Moreover, violence of the sort Lebanese voting stations witness is much less likely to occur in foreign embassies.

However, diaspora voting must be complemented with internal reforms. Some might argue structural change requires international interventions. In reality, international support is needed to complement internal efforts in what cannot be achieved alone – for example, pressuring current political elites, particularly by withholding their illegitimate wealth held abroad – but not replace them. No foreign country will account for Lebanese interests the way the Lebanese will. Others might reason that because a year and a half of protests has not seen its original demands met, change must be hopeless. That is an unrealistic expectation. First, there is more than one way to demand and enact change. Direct action is important as a pressure tool and must be complemented with political action such as voting. Second, establishing and consolidating democracy is a long, demanding, and bumpy road. Progress is almost never linear. For instance, France witnessed the establishment and subsequent collapse of 4 different Republics over the course of 229 years to get to where it is now. Setting sustainable, informed, and realistic goals – like voting for new, capable policymakers to make gradual breakthroughs – can be just as effective in enacting major change on the long run.

While this election might not produce dramatic-enough outcomes, as to enact major structural modifications to the current system, all change needs to start somewhere. It takes one election to produce a snowball effect for the coming years. Once the barrier of fear is broken and competent alternatives are voted into power across all Lebanese districts, it will only become a matter of time before change ensues. 

This article is published as part of the SawtixThe Phoenix Daily Partnership.

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