Beyond the posters – Cultural hegemony over Moussa Al-Sadr’s image

Opinion Analysis by Francesco Pitzalis, Staff Writer and Saba Al-Sadr, Contributor

December 9th, 2020

Political posters are an immersive and pervasive hallmark of Lebanon’s streets. Scholarly input from the likes of Edward Said, Stuart Hall and Zeina Maasri indicates that the function of such political posters extends far beyond singular, unilateral state propaganda. Moussa Al-Sadr’s image, for instance, has been strategically engineered as an instrument for the extension of cultural hegemony and artificial demarcation of geographical space. The tapestry of posters, in the absence of a unified historical blueprint, monopolises the collective memory of Lebanese Leaders. This memory is neither passive nor neutral and fails to historicize, introspect or analyse Lebanon’s tumultuous history to any degree of acuity. Thus, Lebanon remains in a collective and pathological state of selective amnesia towards its past. 

Sayyid Moussa Al-Sadr descends from a line of reformist clerics who trace their lineage back to Jabal Amel. Sadr’s schooling in Najaf and his native Qom was of a similar progressive thought and kindled his ambition towards advancing an ostracised and persecuted people throughout the Middle East. Following his return to Lebanon in 1961, Al-Sadr focussed on the reinvigoration of religious doctrine through a modern lens. A believer in the Lebanese state, Al-Sadr aimed to equalise the systemic state imbalances that worryingly neglected the development of the Shiite South. By establishing harakat-al-mahrumin (movement of the deprived), Al-Sadr lobbied the political establishment for universal improvement of living standards. His optimism led him to believe that this will in fact help unify the state. What he did not anticipate, however, was the passivity of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis the Israeli invasion of the South. Thus, Sadr assumed, in protest, the role of the South’s guardian and advocator for the military defence of Southern Lebanon.  

In a speech in Beirut’s Capuchin Cathedral in 1975, Al-Sadr spoke of the corruption of governance under the guise of religion. He also advocated for unifying religious communities for the sake of humanity and serving in the interest of God. The revolutionary sermon transcended sectarianism and became a centrepiece moment of Lebanese interreligious dialogue. This moment amongst many others left an indelible imprint on the collective memory of the Lebanese following Al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978. 

Encoding and decoding of imagery

Imagery, specifically that of political and cultural figures, is a form of human economy. This is promulgated through the extraction of narrative by a reciprocal, discursive process of encoding and decoding (Hall, 1980). Images of Moussa Al-Sadr are often flanked by Nabih Berri in addition to a well-placed text, for example (see below), “protector of security from the owner of security.”  The unification of Al-Sadr and Berri’s respective images into a single frame, encodes a harmonious narrative of concordance between the two figures. Thus, the artist projects Berri as a worthy custodian of Al-Sadr’s vision. The viewer’s decoding of a poster is predicated on the intersection of the artist’s illustration with “deep semantic codes of culture” (Hall, 1980). This culture exists as an innately ambiguous control system for the establishment of identity, thus facilitating disorderly subjectivity of narrative. 

Figure 1. Figure with Al-Sadr (Left) and Berri (right) pictured.

Cultural Hegemony

The decoding of these posters demands a perspicacious look into the culture within which they exist. For the Shiites of Southern Lebanon, a culture of resistance decolonized a native terrain usurped by western imperia, particularly Zionist incursion from 1948 onwards. In light of state neglect and a failed leftist resistance in the South, Moussa Al-Sadr anchored the mobilization of Lebanon’s Shiites on Islam. Nevertheless, Al-Sadr’s narrative was neither exclusively nor rigidly Islamic and equally embodied a shift in national consciousness towards a more equitable state, a stronger civil society and meaningful intercommunal dialogue. Al-Sadr’s Islamic revival can therefore not be equated to the archetypical nationalist cultures espoused  by the Nassers, Khomeinis and Gaddafis of the time. In these cases, a reflexive extension of hegemonic imperialist culture enshrined a national security state with little introspection or social consciousness. Al-Sadr, by my estimation, was different; a partial outsider who radically attempted to modernise an ossified Lebanese oligarchy with malleable and conscientious reforms.  

The use of Al-Sadr’s memory in posters, is neither a passive nor innocent appreciation of his legacy. As noted by Edward Said, “collective memory is not an inert and passive thing…but a field of activity in which past events are selected, reconstructed, maintained, modified and endowed with political meaning.” By unifying the connotative meanings of Al-Sadr’s legacy with the current rhetoric of Berri, the political poster provides emotional legitimacy for Berri’s actions. This is buttressed by the dual personal-communitarian sentiments felt by many Shiites towards Al-Sadr; a return to faith for the individual and the propagation of a civilised (muhadara), cultured (muthaqafa) and modern interpretation of Shiite Islam. 

Temporal dislocation between Berri and Al-Sadr’s actions make the semantic decoding of these posters entirely unregimented and highly problematic. Particularly as Berri descended into the prototype of a feudal Lebanese Za’im (leader) with an alarming proclivity for tribal confrontation. In entering into a bloody conflict with Yasser Arafat, Berri disavowed Al-Sadr’s amicable relationship with the largely Sunni Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Berri subsequently justified his clashes with the PLO as revenge for “ancient battles”, a thinly veiled reference to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Karbala. 

Irrespective of Berri’s sectarian undertones, Al-Sadr’s image remains a neutralizing and palliating symbol for the polity of Berri, as the latter incredulously claims to stand on the shoulders of his predecessor. A similar appropriation of narrative is seen in the actions of Druze Za’im, Walid Jumblatt. Jumblatt’s father, Kamal, was a meditative socialist thinker, an Arab nationalist and a proponent for the deconstruction of political sectarianism. His son entered a feudal “mountain war” with the Christians of the Lebanese forces, yet still floated disingenuously the progressive and socialist promises espoused by his father. In the cases of both Berri and Jumblatt, past narratives are reconfigured for incumbent political advancement. 

Knowledge and Truth

Foucault observed that power is embedded in the production of knowledge. Power therein constructs and fortifies a “regime of truth” by monopolising knowledge production. In Lebanon, a reciprocal and autonomous relationship exists between the hegemony of the sectarian leaders and the cultures that they propagate. 

Zeina Maasri considers political posters in Lebanon as instruments of “symbolic hegemonic battles” between the political parties. She deemed the mechanism of political posters as distinct from unilateral, state propaganda due to the multimodal power structure of the sectarian system. In renewing tools of culture, the hegemonic regime of truth surrounding each Za’im is consolidated. Where Maasri and I differ in opinion is the following – the renewal of hegemony only exists at each node of the structure and not vis-à-vis political rivals. “Symbolic battles” through use of posters are superfluous and opposition is crucial to reflexively reaffirm the identity of a political movement. Indeed, political culture is robustly delineated by what it is not: Zionist, imperialist, western-facing, for example. Hence, cultural hegemony is renewed by opposition. Concurrently, Said noted that culture is highly incorporative – “everything is processed either towards the dominant mainstream or out to the margins.” 

For example, following the defacing of Moussa Al-Sadr’s image in October 2019, Co-writer, Saba Al-Sadr, called on Amal supporters not to fight revolutionaries over the destruction of her grandfather’s image. She was subsequently castigated by Amal and Hezbollah supporters and slandered as an outsider. Thus, despite being the Imam’s flesh and blood, Saba’s voice was silenced as it was not within the regime of truth. In essence, Hegemony over Moussa Al-Sadr’s image, legacy, narrative, history and therefore “truth” is all centralised by the Amal/Hezbollah political movements. The regime of truth is unassailable and prolific, therefore, in the words of Noam Chomsky, it is a vehicle to “manufacture consent.” 

The Demarcation of Space

Gramsci postulated that history is contingent on geography; dividing territory into contiguously overlapping movements, narratives and collective memories. In Lebanon, political posters differentiate artificial demarcations between areas of different sectarian composition. Demarcation confines each sect to a sense of congenital tribalism, the idea that a polity, a movement or ideology is somehow predicated on a uniquely innate essence or “DNA.” Political movements, through the use of posters, thus generate a conception of “nativeness” or “home” amongst their target base.  This makes it painstakingly difficult for an individual immersed by these stimuli to separate what he or she is from what his or her community represents. Equally, the distinction between what is native and foreign is exacerbated, enhancing fault lines within the Lebanese state itself. 

The protracted entanglement of political movements with native environments engenders a palpable depoliticization between the seemingly irreconcilable sects. One only has to walk into an area of a tangible sectarian nature to know when and on what topics you need to keep your mouth shut on. You would not saunter into Sassine square and debate a local gentleman on the murderous policies of Bachir Gemayel. To oppose Gemayel would possibly be an insult the man, his community, if not the very building where Bachir’s memorial was embossed. Alas, it would not be hyperbole to suggest that certain areas take on a life of their own. 

Take the Jnoob (South), for example, a word so tender and emotive for the Shiites who inhabit it. To be a Shiite in the South means to resist, to endow sumud (steadfastness) and piety as part of a collective organism against the Israeli enemy. Any entity or person opposing the above not only opposes the authority disseminating said narrative, but is ostracised as non-native, alien or invasive. Ostracization is anointed by highly charged words such as: Khayin (traitor), Aamil (collaborator) or Sahyuni (Zionist).

If we consider  Moussa Al-Sadr, his poster is almost exclusively papered across Shiite neighbourhoods. Seldom would you see his image plastered in a Sunni, Christian or Druze neighbourhood, despite reverence for Al-Sadr in strands of these communities. Thus, Al-Sadr’s goals, ideals, visions and values are reconstituted and condensed onto a single sectarian paradigm compatible with the current Amal movement.  

This narrative fallacy rigidifies the Imam’s legacy within the Shiite political sphere; a legacy of unassailable mystique and unwavering good will.  A poignant analogy would be Francis Bacon’s description of the “idol of the cave”, idolizing a figure to the point of epistemological confinement to what is native. One should rigorously question how Lebanon is moving forward by fetishizing the contribution of political leaders. How does this benefit intercommunal dialogue, prevent ideological stasis, if not contribute to a bizarrely blank Lebanese history book? How is venerating Moussa Al-Sadr’s image being appropriated by the current political class? 

Demystification and Liberation

Lebanon has been described by Kamal Salibi as a house of many mansions. I would describe each house as surrounded by a meticulously constructed cultural fence. For Lebanon to act as a state; disparate narratives, cultures and leaders need to be progressively demystified. Nothing should be taken for a given, as asserted by Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, “Think! Challenge what you hear, don’t take it for granted, don’t let anyone lead you except your mind!”. 

No culture is impermeable or detached from its neighbouring cultures. Engaging in a discourse of mutual understanding, adequate historicization and re-politicization between the sects is the key to progression. Likewise, the removal of instruments of cultural hegemony, like posters, is imperative to break the confines of ideological prisons. The narratives propagated from posters are too emotive and lack empiricism. For those who genuinely respect the input of Imam Al-Sadr, it is up to us to deconstruct his life with mindful consciousness towards the dissemination of his image. In the same vein, no one leader is capable of saving the Lebanese state. 

That considered, I feel myself furiously cursing political pages who yearn for a return of past leaders. Placing figures on unimpeachable pedestals is the enemy of forward thinking and fails to account for the complexity of the current situation. No! We do not need a new Fouad Chehab, or a new Moussa Al-Sadr, or any cultural hero of choice. What is needed is a reformation of consciousness from the bottom up, a consciousness that positions every policy and leader in the firing line of a constructive critique.

This article is a call  for rigorous critical analysis on the production of knowledge and manufacturing of consent. Al-Sadr’s life was textured and complex enough to warrant true historicization and interpretation. To reduce Al-Sadr’s image to political jargon and heroized imagery is an insult to his legacy, if his legacy is to be venerated. One should scrupulously question Al-Sadr’s narrative with open eyes. What did he stand for? Why? Would his policy have worked today? Why is his image staring at me? For what purpose? No leader (quite frankly, ever) should be elevated onto a pedestal of irreproachable honour. 

Key References 

1.     Chomsky, Noam & Herman, Edward S. (1988) – Manufacturing Consent 

2.     Deeb, Lara (2006) - An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon

3.     Foucault, Michel (1975) – Discipline and Punish

4.     Gramsci, Antonio (1935) – Prison notebooks 

5.     Hall, Stewart (1980) - Encoding/decoding

6.     Maasri, Zeina (2008) - Off the wall

7.     Mansel, Philip (2010) - Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean

8.     Said, Edward W. (1978) - Orientalism

9.     Said, Edward W. (1993) – Culture & Imperialism 

10.  Said, Edward W. (2001) - Power, politics, and culture

11.  Salibi, Kamal (1988) – A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered.

12.  Traboulsi, Fawwaz (2007) – A History of Modern Lebanon