Multiculturalism in Lebanon - The Sectarian Cleavage at the center of the Lebanese Political Distress
Opinion policy analysis by Anthony Ahrend, Featured Writer
July 6th, 2021
During the US elections of 2020, we saw that there was a very big voter turnout in regions, districts and even states for certain candidates. Sometimes, those votes follow a certain pattern. People located in the suburbs leaned more towards Biden as these people tend to come from lower economic backgrounds, while people in more rural regions voted for Trump. Factory workers joining social parties and religious people joining conservative parties is very common in a lot of western democracies. This distinction is called cleavages.
In political science and sociology, a cleavage is a historically determined social or cultural line that divides citizens within a society into groups with differing political interests, resulting in a political conflict among these groups.
The particularity of Lebanon is that its political map does not follow the normal attributes that other countries possess. In other countries, the line is drawn between owners and workers, church and state, urban and rural, center and periphery, materialistic and post-materialistic and so on. On the other hand, in Lebanon, you have all of those divides, yet one variable surpasses them all: religion. Whole regions and even villages are sorted out based on the dominant religion in that certain area. The country is fragmented and divided into 18 officially recognized sects, none of which constitute a majority in the parliament. With that being said, these religious cleavages have had consequences on the political system of the country over time.
First, it is important to take a look at the voter turnout in the country: Lebanon’s 2018 parliamentary elections, which were the first in nine years’ time, saw a noticeable decrease in voter turnout, with 49.7% of registered voters casting a ballot compared to 54% in 2009 (it is worth noting that the average turnout in the MENA region is relatively low most of the time). This means that one in two citizens choose not to vote, and the reasons could vary from the fact that they don’t want to go there and stand in line to cast a vote that isn’t going to make a difference or there is no party that represents and shares their vision of Lebanon or any other reason there may be.
Of course, this turnout fluctuates depending on the region, age, socio-economic status and other factors too. Beirut and Tripoli cast centers had a turnout as low as 40%, whereas Keserwan and Jbeil had some that exceeded 65%. Older voters voted much more than the youth did, and the same goes for women in comparison to men. Shia and Druze voters had the highest participation rates, whereas Sunni and Alawite voters were the least likely to cast their ballot in 2018. As all executive positions are sorted out based on religion, this creates concurrence between parties that represent the same sect. Yet, some parties have the majority of the votes of their respective sect.
Political participation can be conventional, and elite directed, like voting for instance, or unconventional and more elite challenging like the demonstrations that took place in 2019. Only by looking at the last elections, it is evident that Lebanese citizens express their political displeasure in the system by refraining from voting and protesting in the streets.
The Economist’s democracy index of 2020 shows the country’s current status compared to that of 2007, the year after the 2006 War. It is clear that there is a downgrade in nearly all of the sectors, except the political participation variable that increased, probably due to the demonstrations.
“Lebanon's soil is united, and it belongs to all the Lebanese.” (The Taif Agreement 1.H, 1989); this is how it is supposed to be in theory. However, the Lebanese soil is not united: some villages and even regions consider themselves to be a state in themselves inside of a state. In 1648, the peace of Westphalia laid down the principle of sovereignty of states, sovereignty that Lebanon does not possess due to international actors interfering in national affairs: Iran, the United States, France, Turkey, etc. Cox (2016) describes it in this way: “The Lebanese coexist, yet different communities do not share common experiences, nor do they have a joint vision for the country and its future”. Christians dominated the upper echelons of Lebanese society to a considerable degree, particularly in the early years of the Lebanese Republic. They held the presidency and most seats in Parliament, and they also represented the most powerful socioeconomic community. Following the civil war and over time, the Muslim communities gained more seats, where the number of Muslims in general also increased. Today, there is 61.1% of Muslims, 33.7% of Christians and 5.2% of Druse. This increase can be explained by the massive immigration from Muslim countries, mostly from Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Palestine, as well as massive emigration from Christians, mostly to America and France.
This is a typical case of the exit-voice-loyalty game portrayed by Albert O. Hirschman (1970). It basically shows the option that the consumer has when the quality of the goods is deteriorating. In politics, it is basically the same. There is a government that is not living up to the expectations of the public: the only options are either leaving the country and emigrating, doing nothing, and accepting this fate, or people making their voices heard through demonstrations to re-establish the status quo.
However, it is a little bit more complicated in reality than it seems: in the case of a protest, the state will only react in a positive manner if they know that they need the population’s approval. In other words, in a democracy, if all the factory workers decide to stop working in order to be met with better working conditions for instance, the state will probably try to make a deal with them. They are crucial for society and are usually the biggest voter base for social parties that will have an interest in satisfying their needs. If, however, a few thousand students decide to protest against the rise of alcohol prices for example, the government will probably not respond to these demands.
The same goes for Lebanon and its “Thawra”: if the population had a common structure with leaders that had a list of revendications, then the government would be more interested in going into negotiations and the probability of achieving some of the goals they had set would have been higher, more so than going and blocking the roads has done. The fact that the demonstrations did not take place successively, with big brakes in between their timings and dates, undermined their legitimacy: the government then knows that if roads get blocked and people take over the streets, it will not last, and they will only have to wait until the people decide to stop on their own. It is not credible, and the population has no leverage against the government in this case.
There is another point that has to be made: if one assumes that one party is equivalent to one religion, then that is another problem that needs to be dealt with. In political science, there is a theory called the principal-agent theory. It basically states that a principal (the voters) elects an agent (politicians) to work in their name and for their benefit. But sometimes, these politicians do not work for the good of their voters. Two reasons can be deducted as a result of this: either there is asymmetric information between both parties before the deal, or the agent changes behavior once he/she gets elected. Usually, there is a sense of accountability where the elected elites seek the approval of the population in order to be reelected. Yet, this accountability is not present in Lebanon. The political elites could do whatever pleases them, and their crowd would still be following them no matter what. As long as the same parties have the majority of the votes of their respective religion, then the voters would not have a concrete different option that could truly make a difference. To this day, there is no real concurrence for them.
However, is religion the only variable that explains the political distress in Lebanon? Next to this sectarian cleavage, you have at least three other cleavages co-existing alongside it: socioeconomic, regional and nationality-based. The problem in Lebanon is that these fields are all interrelated and correlate with one another to some extent, the common root being religion.
Socioeconomic factors define who your contacts are, the place you live in, the education you receive. It plays a role in a person’s socialization process. It is expected that wealthy people hang out together and the same would go for those coming from a lower socioeconomical background, regardless of their religious background. Yet, this does not seem to be the case in Lebanon; society is first divided into sectarian tracks, then into social classes within each individual religion. Christians have their own schools, often financed by France; less fortunate Shi’as will get exclusive help from Iran. These countries have found a way of exploiting their soft power through the lack of initiative of the Lebanese government.
For the regional aspect, the arguments are similar. If someone is wealthy, it is more likely that they will live in a certain neighborhood. Unfortunately, some regions are still unsafe for people from specific religions, and as a consequence of the civil war, some towns and villages still have the same demography that dates back to 30 years ago.
As well, the same goes for nationality: examples could be Bourj Hammoud for the Armenian community, the Palestinian refugee camps, Alley for the Druze, and so on so forth. All communities usually prefer living with their own rather than having to integrate themselves into the common Lebanese society. Two Lebanese people might have nothing in common when both of them are living in Lebanon, but if they find each other somewhere else in the world, they will directly connect and understand each other. It would feel like a safe environment, without the need to change the way they live, cook, talk, dress, etc. This can be applied to the principle of immigration in the whole world and this is what is happening in Lebanon. As a person that affiliates oneself with a specific sect, it is well-known that the person is not going to have to change and adapt the way they are used to live if they stay in their natural habitat, and that option is more attractive than having to change the way one has to live.
Nowhere in the world is the confessional cleavage more institutionalized than in Lebanon. Only one governmental agency has the full support of most Lebanese: the Lebanese army that regroups people from all religions. The political system has been claimed to be disproportional and is accused of not including major social and secular forces into politics.
All in all, in order for Lebanon to grow and rise from the ashes, these cleavages need to be broken down. There will not be a united and peaceful Lebanon as long as the different communities do not learn how to coexist and combine themselves together. There needs to be an integration from all sides. However, it is easier said than done as it shakes up the status quo and therefore, the political system and the elites.
References:
- Cox, F. D., Orsborn, C., & Sisk, T. 2016. Religion, peacebuilding, and social cohesion in conflict affected countries research report. Denver, CO: University of Denver.
- Hirschman, A. O. 1972. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press
- Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. 1967. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction. S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter
- Sanchez, D.G. 2021. Understanding Turnout in the Lebanese Elections. The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies
- The Economist. 2020. Democracy Index 2020, In sickness and in health? The Economist Intelligence Unit